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With a growing number of real-world applications that are dependent on com-
putation, securing the information space has become a challenge. The security of
information in such applications is often jeopardized by software and hardware fail-
ures, intervention of human subjects such as attackers, incorrect design specification
and implementation, other social and natural causes. Since these applications are
very diverse, often cutting across disciplines a generic approach to detect and miti-
gate these issues is missing. This dissertation addresses the fundamental problem of
verifying information security in a class of real world applications of computation,
the Cyber-physical systems (CPSs).
One of the motivations for this work is the lack of a unified theory to specify and
verify the complex interactions among various cyber and physical processes within
a CPS. Security of a system is fundamentally characterized by the way information
flows within the system. Information flow within a CPS is dependent on the physi-
cal response of the system and associated cyber control. While formal techniques of
verifying cyber security exist, they are not directly applicable to CPSs due to their
inherent complexity and diversity. This Ph.D. research primarily focuses on devel-
oping a uniform framework using formal tools of process algebras to verify security
properties in CPSs. The merits in adopting such an approach for CPS analyses are
three fold- i) the physical and continuous aspects and the complex CPS interactions
can be modeled in a unified way, and ii) the problem of verifying security proper-
ties can be reduced to the problem of establishing suitable equivalences among the
processes, and iii) adversarial behavior and security properties can be developed us-
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1. INTRODUCTION
Critical infrastructure refers to a wide range of systems that deliver critical
services to the society in a reliable, safe, dependable and secure fashion. The com-
plexity of critical infrastructure is dramatically increasing. Electric power transmis-
sion and distribution, air traffic control, and cruise control for automobiles, among
many other systems, will soon become “smart grids” for managing electric power,
automated air traffic management for aircraft routing, and “smart” cruise control
for automobiles. Unlike their predecessors, these modern systems include not only
physical components, but also software. These integrated systems are examples of
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs). Formally, CPSs are integrations of computation
with physical processes [1]. Potential CPSs include high-confidence medical devices
and systems, traffic control and safety, advanced automotive systems, process con-
trol, energy conservation, environmental control, avionics and instrumentation.
The complexity of a CPS results from the highly networked and distributed
nature of the physical and cyber components within. Smart Grid systems poten-
tially include thousands of power lines, transformers, meters, power flow controllers,
and communicating embedded computers. Air traffic control is comprised of air-
planes with communicating embedded computers. Smart cruise control consists of
embedded computers in automobiles that potentially communicate with surrounding
automobiles on the highway. All these components interact with each other, some-
times in unpredictable ways. Reliance on the critical infrastructure means reliance
on the physical components and cyber components, and their interactions. A sig-
nificant concern is the increased number of places within a CPS that are vulnerable
to attack and/or failure. The vulnerability of critical infrastructure to cyber and
physical failures was apparent in the 2003 U.S. blackout [2] and the recent findings
2of cyber malware like the Stuxnet worm [3] [4] that compromise supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems. New attack models that are infrastructure
dependent are discussed in literature, like the false data injection attacks in SCADA
systems [5].
1.1. UNDERSTANDING SECURITY REQUIREMENTS FOR A CPS
Security of a system is generally described in terms of availability, integrity, and
confidentiality. Availability refers to the ability to use the information or resource as
desired. Integrity refers to the prevention of unauthorized or unintended change of
data or resources. Confidentiality is the confinement of information or resources to
the trusted entities within a system [6]. All three aspects of security are necessary in
a CPS. Conventional concepts like authentication, access control and cryptographic
methods don’t always offer secure ways of dealing with information, especially when
computation involves physical entities as in CPSs. An attacker who is an insider or
who can compromise specific cyber components, has access to more information by
associating the received cyber information with his physical observability. Hence,
it is important to ensure the confidentiality within the system to prevent the at-
tacker from obtaining critical information, that could be used to perform availability
and integrity attacks. Understanding, modeling, and ensuring security in a CPS is
a significant challenge because any analysis must account for both the cyber and
physical components of a system and their interactions. There is an interdependence
of events within the cyber and physical domains often leading to more fundamental
security issues. The primary challenge, particularly when considering cyber-physical
interactions, is to find a uniform semantic basis for the analysis. Confidentiality, in
particular, has received lesser attention in the context of CPSs due to the lack of
a unified theory. Information flow policies provide an appealing semantic basis in
3quantifying CPS interactions since they define the way information moves through-
out a system [6]. The security analysis of a CPS, therefore, requires an analysis of the
cyber components, the physical components, and, most importantly, the interactions




























Figure 1.1. Cyber-physical interactions
1.1.1. Cyber Information Flow. The purely cyber portion of a CPS
includes interconnected cyber components that exchange data to compute actions
or responses. Cyber systems are vulnerable to worms, viruses, denial-of-service at-
tacks, malware, phishing, and user errors that compromise integrity and availability.
Confidentiality is a prime aspect of many cyber systems. A great deal of analysis is
concerned with ensuring data confidentiality through well-known mechanisms such
as cryptography. Beyond this, information flow properties for a general class of deter-
ministic and non-deterministic systems have been addressed [7] [8]. These classical
models of information flow security are concerned with quantifying information that
is downgraded via covert channels to observers. The complexity of securing cyber
information space in CPSs lies in tying the cyber components to the physical system
and thereby, the cyber-physical interactions.
41.1.2. Physical Commodity Flow. The purely physical portion of a CPS
includes interconnected physical components that perform or control certain physical
actions like monitoring physical commodity flow. Commodity refers to the main
resource that is transported over an infrastructure; for example, gas is the commodity
transported over a gas pipeline system and power is the commodity distributed
over an electric power grid. The infrastructures are usually controlled at specific
geographic locations and consist of several physical components such as power lines,
buses, pipes, and joints. Commodity flow changes due to usage or control settings
and are governed primarily by the laws of physics and the topology of the physical
system. Physical commodity flow is governed by the concept of invariant flow of a
physical entity. For example, the flow in a gas pipeline changes in accordance with
the laws of gas flow, and power flowing through every branch of a power grid varies
according to Kirchhoff’s laws. Physical systems have a separate set of vulnerabilities
that expose them to physical attacks that can affect both availability and integrity. A
CPS is inherently exposed to the outside world due to its physical nature; automobile
and aircraft movements can be observed, pipeline and electric power flow can be
measured. These observations yield information about the system and its underlying
control processes and settings. The interconnection topology of a system, coupled
with the observations from physical flow, provide information. In general, however, it
is difficult to prevent unauthorized or undesirable information flow within a physical
system.
1.1.3. Cyber-Physical Interactions. Cyber-physical interactions result
from the coupling of the information and commodity flows in a CPS (represented
by the center plane in Figure 1.1). In a CPS, cyber processes interact with physical
components by reading their physical states and actuating the controlled physical
components. Clearly, there is an interdependence of actions in the cyber and phys-
ical domains. Vulnerabilities are a natural consequence of this interdependence; an
5action in one part of the system is causally felt in other parts of the system, lead-
ing to information flow leakage at the cyber-physical boundary. In other words, an
observation about commodity flow could permit an observer to infer sensitive cyber
actions.
Security considerations for a CPS, therefore, depend on cyber information flow,
physically observable behavior, and the interactions among the cyber and physical
components of the system. Due to infrastructure interdependencies [9] [10], a com-
promise in the security of one system may threaten another system. For example, a
failure of security at a fuel plant that depends on a gas pipeline to generate power for
the electric power grid affects the security of the power grid. Timing, security [11]
and frequency [12] are key properties that have an impact on the confidentiality
of a system. Information flow analysis is a fundamental concept in theory, that is
generally used to reason about the security violations due to the way information
moves within the system. A theoretical basis for information flow analysis is based
on security models outlined by McClean [8] [13] [14] and Zakinthinos et al. [15]. The
complexity of CPS interactions however exceeds the ability of informal information
flow analysis methods.
1.2. CONTRIBUTIONS OF THIS WORK
Automating the process of verifying information flow properties in CPSs re-
quires specification of the system behavior within a formal framework. Process
algebras [16] provide both a rigorous system specification and associated verification
(model checking) procedures, but have been rarely used because of their complexity.
However, formal methods researchers have made automated theorem proving and
model checking techniques more capable and efficient in the recent years, to formally
verify many properties of distributed and real systems. The significant contribution
of this work is to develop a formal framework that satisfies the following objectives:
6• It should provide a robust specification of a real system that captures the
distributed, concurrent, asynchronous and mobile nature of interactions among
various processes.
• It should provide a semantically uniform way of bridging the diverse cyber and
physical spaces.
• It should facilitate the automatic verification of information flow security prop-
erties.
This work primarily adopts the process algebraic approach to accomplish the
above objectives. The main findings discussed in this dissertation have been reported
in the following publications:
1. In [17], the specification of a CPS was presented in a basic process algebra, the
Security Process Algebra (SPA). Process algebraic techniques like bisimulation
were used to define information flow security properties in SPA. Manual proofs
were presented to verify non-deducibility properties for different cases of an
attacker who can break the confidentiality within the system.
2. In [18], a general approach was laid out to automate the verification of infor-
mation flow properties for any CPS. A test CPS was used to demonstrate the
process and the results of automatic verification of non-deducibility on the test
CPS was presented.
3. In [19], information flow properties were developed and verified in an advanced
process algebra, the pi-calculus. It was shown that the verification using pi-
calculus was more robust because of its rich features to model complex aspects
of distributed computation, and the ability to define a wide variants of basic
information flow properties.
74. The process algebraic verification of security properties in CPSs was demon-
strated in this dissertation with the help an advanced smart grid architecture
that was published in [20] [21].
5. Prior work that formed the basis of this Ph.D research can be found in [22], [23],
and [24].
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Section 2, a
study of existing CPS security methods is presented and the case for information
flow analysis is established. Section 3 includes a discussion of formal specification
and verification techniques that could be adopted for CPS analyses. In Section 4,
information flow properties that are attractive to CPS architectures are described.
The essence of this work is explained with the help of a running example of a dis-
tributed CPS introduced in Section 5. Section 6 illustrates the approach involved in
specification and verification of information flow properties in CPSs. In Section 7,
an advanced process algebra, the pi-calculus, is adopted to address some of the chal-
lenges encountered using conventional process algebras for CPS analyses. It will be
shown that the pi-calculus facilitates a better reasoning of security in CPSs due to
its rich features and tool support for automatic verification illustrated in Section 8.
Finally, the key findings of research performed towards this dissertation are discussed
in Section 9.
82. STATE OF THE ART IN CPS SECURITY
The existing work on CPS security can be classified into the following categories
based on what they address- i) standards for CPS security, ii) impact of cyber security
on the secure operations of the physical system, iii) impact of physical system security
on secure cyber operations, and iv) impact of cyber-physical interactions on CPS
security.
2.1. STANDARDS FOR CPS SECURITY
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has released guide-
lines to address the growing concerns of smart grid security [25]. The report presents
recommendations on architectures, requirements and strategies that lead to improved
security, privacy and reliability of smart grid. Some of the reasons that pose addi-
tional risk to the grid include increased complexity of the grid due to interconnected
networks leading to increased entry points for potential adversaries and the impact of
coordinated cyber-physical attacks. Confidentiality is an increasing concern to pro-
tect i) the privacy of the consumer, ii) the electric market information and iii) the
power company. Detection of covert channels and eliminating them during runtime
is extremely necessary. The use of formal methods-based techniques like information
flow analysis is suggested.
The North American Electric Regulatory Commission (NERC) has defined cy-
ber security standards [26] for electric energy infrastructure. These standards are
intended to provide a cyber security framework to identify risks, help secure critical
cyber assets, and ensure that the electric power grid operates reliably. In particular,
Standards CIP-001-2 through CIP-009-4 address security issues in the bulk electric
9system such as the identification of critical cyber assets and their physical protec-
tion, reporting of sabotaged behavior, incident reporting and recovery plans, security
management control, etc.
A Department of Energy (DOE) publication [27] discussed existing cyber secu-
rity standards, focusing specifically on control systems used in critical infrastructures.
The standards help identify requirements for secure communication protocols and
systems. Philips et al. [28] have conducted a broad investigation of the operational
and security challenges of an advanced power grid involving Unified Power Flow
Controller (UPFC) devices. Unlike SCADA systems, however, coordinated UPFC
devices manipulate a smart power grid in a decentralized manner so that new security
issues emerge. The authors discussed best practices, policies and risk assessment at
the control level to achieve confidentiality, integrity, and availability in a cooperative
UPFC power network.
The standards in place are insufficient to ensure the security of CPSs given the
evolution of a wide range of threats exploiting the vulnerabilities of these systems.
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) conducted a broad investigation of
different critical infrastructures to assess the current state of the art and identify
challenges for cyber-physical systems security [29]. The report includes best prac-
tices, vulnerabilities and major factors affecting the system security of six critical
infrastructures- electric energy, chemical, transportation, water, healthcare and com-
mercial facilities. Two key challenges were identified to be essential for protecting
cyber infrastructures - i) appropriate integration, protection, detection, and response
mechanisms to construct CPSs that are resilient to both accidental failures, malicious
attacks or manipulations, and surreptitious monitoring, and ii) verification and val-
idation of interconnected and interacting control system components for the overall
process by developing models, theories, and tools that account for a system’s cyber
and physical components in an integrated, unified way. “The unique security needs
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of cyber-physical systems must be documented by formal requirements capture tools
that can track both the discrete and continuous aspects of cyber-physical systems.
In essence, what is not understood well cannot be built and verified correctly.” A
generalized theory is needed to address the security challenges emerging from the
increasing complexity of CPSs.
2.2. FOCUS ON CYBER SECURITY FOR SECURE OPERATIONS
OF THE PHYSICAL SYSTEM
Compromised cyber components can be used to send undesirable control com-
mand or data to the physical system, thereby compromising the desired operation of
the physical system. The Stuxnet worm (W32.Stuxnet) [3] [4] serves as an extreme
case of such attacks. The Stuxnet is a rootkit that divulges information and subverts
industrial systems by targeting Siemens programmable logic controllers. The attack
was undetectable since the worm fakes the control signals so that no false alarms
are raised when a system is infected. Therefore, protection of the cyber domain and
analysis of impact on the physical system due to compromised cyber component(s)
are both necessary to secure operations of the physical system.
Holstein et al. [30] discussed SCADA cyber security to mitigate known vulner-
abilities to attacks like the replay attack and the known-key attack etc. The goal
was to protect communication packets, and to provide authorization and role-based
access controls for interfacing control operations with energy management and dis-
tribution systems. They developed schemes for the protection of data based on the
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) to provide encryption and authentication,
and cryptographic key management. While it is critical to adopt these practices, the
possibility that information flows from the protected cyber domain to the observable
physical network still remains.
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McDonald et al. [31] have investigated control vulnerabilities associated with
the energy sector. Their approach engages the Virtual Control System Environment
(VCSE) that simulates and emulates the various elements of a control system de-
pendent infrastructure like the cyber and physical components, human interfaces,
etc. The VCSE tool set allows users to model any large infrastructure and assess its
vulnerabilities. Different cyber attacks like the man-in-the-middle attack, rogue soft-
ware attack, presence of unencrypted channels, etc. were simulated in this framework
to validate the security of a given infrastructure. However, their approach requires
a very detailed model of the infrastructure being analyzed.
Liu et al. [5] discuss the impact of false data injection attacks against state
estimation in electric power grids. In power grids, state estimation is generally used
to monitor the power system state by estimating unknown state variables based on
the readings of meters placed at specific locations on the grid. The output of state
estimation enables the system operators to identify potential operational problems in
the grid and take decisions accordingly. During this process, bad data measurements
are detected and removed to protect state estimation [32]. The authors show that
it is possible to perform a false data injection attack in which the attacker injects
malicious measurements that will bypass the existing bad data detection techniques
and thereby, interferes with the state estimation process. It was assumed that the
attacker can access the current power system configuration and manipulate the mea-
surements of meters at physically protected locations such as substations. The at-
tacker constructs an attack vector comprised of arbitrary measurements introduced
at the meters he has access to. An efficient construction of such an attack vector was
shown to be possible, given that the attacker has access to a matrix of measurements
and state variables. It was shown that even if the attacker was constrained to specific
meters or limited in the resources required to compromise the meters, construction
of such attack vectors change the results of state estimation in arbitrary ways.
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In a similar work by Sastry et al. [33], the attacker is assumed to obtain per-
turbed data (and not necessarily, the complete configuration as in [5]) to perform a
deception attack on state estimator in SCADA for electric power systems. Control
theoretic methods were applied to compute the attack vector for two widely used
bad data detection schemes. The discussion on these bad data detection schemes
is beyond the scope of this work. It was shown that it is possible to compute and
stealthily inject false data into the SCADA system to alter the state estimation,
considering the uncertainity associated with the partial or out-dated model available
to the attacker.
2.3. FOCUS ON PHYSICAL SYSTEM SECURITY FOR SECURE
CYBER OPERATIONS
A deviation from the expected behavior of the physical system indicates a
malfunction or security violation at the physical system (considering an application
dependent error). The expected behavior of the physical system is calculated based
on real-time guarantees of the embedded systems within or with the control signal
estimates. So, it is possible to detect specific cyber attacks that considerably change
the expected behavior of the physical system.
In [34], Mueller et al. detect the execution of unauthorized instructions in
CPS-based real-time embedded systems by utilizing information obtained from static
timing analysis. Timing analysis in hard real-time systems is a strict requirement to
verify that all tasks meet their deadlines, failing which the application is considered
incorrect. During static timing analysis, the aggregated cost of instruction blocks
and architectural timing effects are considered, to calculate the bounds on execution
times. Unauthorized code potentially takes an unusual amount of time to execute.
The assumption is that during an attack, hardware parameters like memory latencies
and processor frequencies remain unmodified and the time bounds on code sections
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are determined prior to the schedule. They propose Worst Case Execution Times
(WCETs) for specific code sections that safely bound the upper execution time;
execution times above these bounds provide indications of a system compromise.
Based on the granularity of time bounds on the application code, three techniques of
intrusion detection are designed; Timed Return Execution that is used to monitor the
execution of selected code sections at application-level checkpoints, Timed Progress
Tracking that makes synchronous calls to the operating system scheduler at security
checkpoints and assesses time bounds for longer code sections and Timed Address
Execution Tracking that utilizes the asynchronous scheduler calls to validate time
bounds for approximated code sections. These techniques can be employed to detect
intrusions based on code injection attacks on the cyber control layer of a CPS. While
such detection is necessary, the ability of an attacker to change the physical system
behavior by injecting false data was not addressed.
In [35], Sastry et al. proposed a method to detect the cyber attacks that
change the behavior of the underlying physical system in a process control system.
In such systems, the state of the physical system is monitored by a network of
sensors placed at specific locations on the physical system. The physical system is
modeled as a composition of control input sequences, output sequences and output
estimates calculated from the sensor data. Their argument is that “if it is known
how the output sequence, y(k) of the physical system at a time instance, k, should
react to the control input sequence, u(k), then any attack to the sensor data can
be potentially detected by comparing the expected output y(k) with the received
(possibly compromised) signal ˜y(k).” Depending on the quality of the estimate y(k),
there could be false alarms indicating something wrong with the state of the system.
It was assumed that since the signal sent by the sensors to the control center lies
within specific bounds of measurement, at any specific time the signal coming from
the attack sensors can be made to fall within the same range. These attack models
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also assume that the attacker has a knowledge of: (1) the exact linear control model
of the physical system, (2) the time to detect an attack and the probability of a false
alarm, and (3) the control command signals (range of y(k)).
2.4. FOCUS ON CYBER-PHYSICAL INTERACTIONS FOR CPS
SECURITY
Cyber-physical events often reveal information about the physical system through
interactions that make the physical actions observable. Such information can be used
by an intelligent attacker to violate the confidentiality of the CPS.
In ubiquitous computing systems that are deployed in residential environments,
privacy leaks exist even when all the sensor transmissions are encrypted. Srinivasan
et al. [36] propose fingerprint and timing based snooping attack model under which
the attacker needs only the timestamp and the unique RF waveform pattern (finger-
print) of each radio message. The temporal distance of the transmission patterns of
each pair of sensors is calculated to cluster the sensors with minimum distance be-
tween them. Such a calculation will group the sensors belonging to each room of the
house into a cluster, whose activity can then be monitored. They also suggest that
use of attenuators and introduction of random delays on transmissions can protect
against these fingerprint and timing based snooping attacks. Inference attacks based
on the physical observability of events like turning on/off of a light, along with the
proposed snooping attacks can significantly compromise the privacy of the residents.
Security analysis of CPSs based on unified cyber and physical behaviors of the
system was performed in Sastry et al. in [37]. The authors investigated the vulnera-
bilities of the SCADA for the Gignac water canal system, brought by compromising
the sensors and actuators. The authors developed a partial differential equation
(PDE) system representing the SCADA control and the water flow in this network
of canal pools. This PDE system is extended to include the physical behavior of the
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system under specific attack models. The primary attack model is comprised of an
adversary sending incorrect data from the sensors to affect the intended objective of
automatic control methods. It was observed that the possibility of an adversary to
withdraw water from the canal stealthily exists. The stealthy deception attack in-
volves modifying the water level sensors to send false measurements to the SCADA
controller such that the SCADA system does not respond to counter adversarial
action of withdrawing water from the off-take. This can happen in the system, if
the injected false data is close to the current actual reading and so the deviation is
negligible to the controller. The authors showed how the stealthy water withdrawal
by the attacker through sensor deception can be included in the PDE system, as a
combination of switching signals to discretely open/close the off-take gates. False
data can be injected accordingly for upstream and downstream flows of water in the
canal pools. Such an attack can be extended to multiple pools by approximating the
effect of water withdrawal at upstream/downstream canal pools and manipulating
the upstream/downstream sensors to send false data to the SCADA controller.
This dissertation addresses a similar problem with special focus on analyzing
the confidentiality violation due to the nature of cyber-physical interactions within
the system. It is possible to obfuscate the critical operations with respect to the
observer by injecting events, called compensating events, that nullify the causal effect
of the critical operations [23]. A taxonomy composed of the security properties of the
sensor network, the threat model, and the security design space for SCADA systems
is discussed in [38]. Control theoretic analysis coupled with information security for
secure control of CPSs was investigated in [39]. In [40], a unified critical systems
ontology was developed that aids in the assessment and modeling of reliability, safety,
liveness, fault tolerance, security, and human aspects of CPSs. A summary of the
above literature is presented in Table 2.1.
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Table 2.1. Summary of existing work in CPS security
Study of Approach Comments
Standards for CPS se-
curity [26] [27] [28] [29]
Identifies best practices and
guidelines that suit different
CPS architectures
Broader scope for fur-
ther research exists
Impact of cyber secu-
rity on the secure op-
erations of the physical
system [30] [31] [5] [33]
Suggests cryptographic, ac-
cess control and other cyber
security mechanisms to pre-
vent attacks on physical sys-
tem
False data injection at-
tacks can be performed
on the physical system
due to compromised
cyber component(s)
Impact of physical sys-
tem security on se-
cure cyber operations
[34] [35]
Cyber attacks are detected
based on deviation from se-
cure and expected behavior
of physical system






Showed how attacks can
be performed exploiting the
nature of CPS interactions
Information flow mod-
els can provide a better
reasoning
2.5. DIRECTION TAKEN IN THIS WORK
Information flow policies provide an appealing semantic basis in analyzing CPS
interactions, since they define the way information moves throughout a system. Infor-
mation flow security guarantees that no information flows from a high-level security
domain to a low-level security domain. Modeling of the CPS is necessary in order to
verify if a given CPS satisfies an information flow model. A discussion of information
flow models that are attractive to CPSs, is presented in Section 4. However, two
shortcomings exist:
1) representation of the concurrent and distributed interactions within a CPS
while capturing the discrete and continuous aspects is complex,
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2) a generalized approach to verify information flow security is lacking primarily
because information flow within CPSs is less studied.
This work addresses those shortcomings by proposing a novel direction using process
algebras to model and verify security properties within a CPS.
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3. FORMAL SPECIFICATION AND VERIFICATION METHODS
Specification of a system is a formal description of its expected behavior. A
system specification can be used to check whether the real implementation of the
system is behaviorally equivalent to its specification. For this reason, the specification
should embrace the features and logic of the system as closely as possible to the
real system. The specification is then verified for a particular property or policy.
This area of formal methods is very well studied over decades to verify software as
well as hardware for correct design, reliability and functionality. The advantage of
undertaking such mathematical and computational rigor lies in enhanced reliability
and assurance. Modeling and verification of systems is an emerging research aspect
in the CPS community to verify that a given a CPS satisfies functional correctness
and meets the expected criteria. However, representation of the concurrent and
distributed interactions within a CPS while capturing the discrete and continuous
aspects is complex.
Different approaches to model and formally analyze CPSs exist. A common
approach to model CPSs is a treatment similar to hybrid systems. The behavior of
a hybrid system is characterized by the continuous dynamics of the physical system
and the discrete nature of the embedded control. The hybrid system behavior can be
defined in terms of hybrid automata [41]. Hybrid automata abstract the continuous
evolution of the physical system defined in terms of ordinary differential equations,
and the discrete transitions which characterize the change of automaton state. The
continuous change is defined in terms of flows that characterize the control mode
represented as differential equations. The discrete changes are represented using
jumps that define the control switch leading to a value at the conclusion of a dis-
crete change. The automata consists of states that abstract the flows and transition
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on conditions defined by jumps. The composition of hybrid automata was defined
as the time synchronization of two automata over common events. The hybrid au-
tomata can be model checked to determine if any of the reachable states violated
the defined correctness or security property [42]. Work in these lines has been re-
cently performed in [43] and [44]. However, modeling communication among various
distributed components of a CPS is difficult using hybrid automata. Moreover, the
complexity of verification on the enormous state space exist. Modeling of communi-
cation and concurrency among various cyber and physical processes also remains a
challenge.
A unified approach to deal with CPSs is necessary that can encompass the
non-deterministic and concurrent nature and develop uniform semantics of cyber and
physical processes of a CPS. Hybrid systems do not model all aspects of CPSs since
the distributed nature of CPSs is ignored. Process algebras, by contrast provide at-
tractive framework to define the concurrency, communication and non-deterministic
nature in systems. Platzer [45] advocated that logical analysis of CPSs combines the
logical verification approach of hybrid systems and of distributed hybrid systems.
To this end, the use of process algebraic theory coupled with hybrid systems theory
provides a unified framework to model and verify distributed CPSs.
Traditional process algebras like the Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS)
[16] and Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) [46] capture non-determinism,
communication, recursion, process abstraction and process divergence, but their
treatment is different. For example, CSP provides different operators for communi-
cation and interleaving of events while CCS offers a single operator to perform both.
However, communication happens in CCS semantics when the interleaved events
are complementary, leading to an internal event. Such semantic differences coupled
with different notions of equivalences that process algebras offer, help understand
the behavior of systems.
20
Unfortunately, in some CPSs, process interactions could be dynamic meaning
that processes might establish connections arbitrarily with other processes; thus the
structure of communication is dynamic. In Section 3.1, a process algebra based on
CCS, called the SPA is presented. SPA is useful to specify the behavior of distributed
systems and to verify the security properties within. Due to the limitations discussed
later, SPA cannot model all aspects of CPS interactions and hence, the pi-calculus
introduced in Section 3.2 is adopted.
3.1. SECURITY PROCESS ALGEBRA (SPA)
SPA [47] [48] is an extension of CCS - a language for specifying concurrent
systems. It provides an algebra for defining larger systems from smaller subsystems
in a bottom-up fashion. The basic building blocks are atomic activities called ac-
tions. Unlike in CCS, SPA actions belong to two different levels of confidentiality,
permitting the specification of multilevel (actually, two-level) systems. The syntax
for describing a system using SPA is:
E ::= 0 | µ.E | E1 + E2 | E1|E2 | E\L | E\IL | E/L | E[f ] | Z.
In the above syntax, 0 is the empty process that cannot perform any action (specifi-
cally defines termination of a process ); µ.E performs action µ and then behaves like
E; E1 + E2 can alternatively choose to behave like E1 or E2; E1|E2 is the parallel
composition of E1 and E2, where the executions of the two systems are interleaved;
E\L executes all the actions that can be performed by E, provided that they do not
belong to L ∪ L¯ (where L¯ refers to the output); E\IL requires that the actions of
E do not belong to L ∩ I; E/L transforms all the actions in L into internal actions;
if E can execute action µ, then E[f ] performs f(µ); and finally, Z performs the
actions that E performs if Z ≡ E. Following the customary notation, τ ∈ Tr is a
system trace, τ\x is a trace purged of all events in the domain of x, τ |x is a trace
restricted to all events in the domain of x, and E1|E2 is the parallel composition
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of events E1 and E2. Additionally, High and Low are used to represent H and L
security domains containing H and L users, respectively. Also, the symbols I and
O represent inputs and outputs, respectively. The operational semantics of the key




























E\L a−→E′\L if a /∈ L∪L
Figure 3.1. Operational semantics in SPA
SPA is used in the analysis presented in Section 6 to demonstrate the capability
of process algebras in modeling CPSs. However, modeling the interaction among
symmetric cyber processes that exhibit different behaviors was difficult. Additionally,
using SPA, it was difficult to capture the dynamism involved in interactions between
specific cyber processes that communicate to perform specific actions on the physical
system. An advanced mechanism is required that will distinguish messages from
symmetric processes based on the channels of communication. The case of multiple
observers interacting to downgrade information from the system can be analyzed
with this new mechanism. Hence the development of a pi-calculus based information
flow theory will be the next step.
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3.2. THE pi-CALCULUS
The pi-calculus [49] is an enhanced version of CCS [16], that offers attractive
formalism of processes establishing communication with other processes over dy-
namic channels. Such a dynamic communication can be represented using semantic
operators like restriction (of a message to a channel), and scope extrusion through
which the dynamically changing scope of the communication domain is abstracted
through sending of channel names as messages to processes that did not have access
to those channels before. Among the other novel features of pi-calculus, notable are
the ability to model communication among processes over dynamic links, and the
notion of equality testing based on bisimulation. In pi-calculus, an infinite set of
names (m, n, p, q, r, etc.) are used for communication channels, and an infinite
set of variables (x, y, z, etc. ) are used to define the terms. The set of processes
is defined by the grammar shown in Figure 3.2. The null process 0 does nothing.
A composition P|Q behaves as processes P and Q running in parallel. Processes
operate on channels to communicate with each other and with the outside world.
The basic interaction is defined using x¯ < N >.P that defines an output process
that is ready to output on channel x, or x(m).P that defines an input process that
is ready to receive a value over channel x. The replication !P behaves as an infinite
number of copies of P running in parallel. The name restriction operator (νn.P) is






x¯ < N >.P Message Output
Figure 3.2. pi-calculus syntax
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A novel contribution of process algebraic theory is the ability to verify the equiv-
alence of two systems. Different process algebras offer different notions of equiva-
lence based on their structural operational semantics. Two processes are bisimulation
equivalent if there exists a bisimulation relation including both the processes as a pair
(formally introduced in Section 4.5). Verification of such equivalence among systems
was studied independently by Paige et al. [50] and Kanellakis et al. [51]. However,
to verify the equivalence of systems based on security, specification semantics to
represent private communication among processes are required.
An extension of the pi-calculus, the spi calculus, was introduced by Abadi and
Gordon to specify and analyze cryptographic protocols [52]. Spi calculus extends
the regular implication of restriction and scope extrusion using channels in the pi-
calculus, by providing operators using which messages transmitted over the channel
can be encrypted/decrypted. The receiver of the encrypted message on the channel
can perform a function on the received message can be decrypted using the shared
key. Spi calculus can be used to analyze a variety of cryptographic protocols by
defining the cryptographic operations using the channels in systems for distributed
security. In spite of all the features the process algebras (CCS, CSP, pi-calculus)
and their variants offer, they cannot still be directly applied to CPS environments
because of the inability to capture the continuous dynamics of a CPS.
The φ-calculus proposed by Rounds and Song [53] is an extension of the pi-
calculus to hybrid systems. A hybrid system can be defined using the φ-calculus
as the communication among concurrent hybrid automata defining the CPS envi-
ronment. In [54], Jifeng proposed a formal description language for hybrid systems
based on CSP by developing trace semantics for the differential equations guiding
the continuous system. A theory that bridges the process algebraic approach and
hybrid systems theory for the purpose of security verification in CPSs is missing and
24
this work is an attempt in that direction. Recently, Wolfthusen et al. [55], models
process control systems with adversarial behavior characterized as pi-processes.
The CPS specification should entail the cyber and physical components and
the interactions among them. Most importantly, the continuous nature (like flow
invariance) of the physical network should be discretized to be represented as an
interacting process with the cyber processes. Information flow models that are of in-
terest to CPS security and their applicability within the process algebraic framework
are discussed in Section 4.
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4. INFORMATION FLOW MODELS
Information flow security guarantees that no information flows from a high-level
security domain to a low-level security domain within a system. Information flow
has been studied primarily for program and language security [56]. Various security
models that analyze system security from the perspective of access control or execu-
tion sequence have been discussed for decades [13] [15]. However, this work has not
been directly applied to CPSs. In a CPS, information flows between and within the
cyber and physical components. Unfortunately, access control policies like the Bell-
La Padula model [57] do not prevent information propagation because they do not
control how information will be used. The possibility that confidential information
may be inferred from the observable information flow represents a potential source
of critical information leakage. Information flow models aid in understanding how
information is leaked across the cyber-physical boundary and how this information
may be downgraded by an observer within the system.
In the following sections, τ ∈ Tr is a system trace, τ\x is a trace purged of
all events in the domain of x, τ |x is a trace restricted to events in the domain of
x, E1|E2 is the parallel composition of events E1 and E2, H and L are high-level
and low-level security domains, respectively, and I and O are inputs and outputs. A
legal or valid trace of a system is defined as an event trace, the order of which is such
that the output events are always preceded by their corresponding input events. A
H (L) event is one that occurs within the H(L) domain. A L observation is a special
case of a L event.
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4.1. NON-INTERFERENCE
Non-interference [7] seems to be the natural way of defining the information
flow behavior which states that the high level interactions does not interfere with the
low level observability. In other words, information does not flow from H domain to
L domain if the H behavior has no effect on what L observer can observe.
Let S be a set of subjects, Σ be a set of system states, O: a set of outputs,
Z: a set of commands and C = S × Z: a set of subject, command pairs indicating
which subject executed which command. A state transition function T : C×Σ→ Σ
specifies to which state the system transitions to when some command c is executed
in a state σ, and an output function P : C×Σ→ O describes the output of executing
c in state σ. Two functions, proj (projecton) and pi (purge) are defined to formalize
non-interference. The projection function is used to see the outputs that a subject
can see for a given state of a system, e.g. proj(S,Cs, σi) would result in the outputs
from the command sequence Cs that subject S can see given state σi. The purge
function has three forms:
• piG(Cs): This function will remove all elements in the command sequence Cs
which involve subject S, for S ∈ G where G is some subset of subjects.
• piA(Cs): This function will remove all elements in the command sequence Cs
which involve action Z, for Z ∈ A where A is some subset of actions.
• piG,A(Cs): This is a combination of piG and piA where the conditions of both
functions must hold for an element to be removed.
TheG users are non-interfering withG′ users if for all valid command sequences,
proj(S,Cs, σi) = proj(S, piG,A(Cs), σi) for S ∈ G′. For a simple system with two
groups, a H domain and an L domain,
NInt(ES) ≡ ∀τ ∈ Tr, τ\H = τ |L (1)
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This can be interpreted as follows: for all possible command sequences, all L
projections are the same regardless if the H actions are purged out of the command
sequence.
4.2. NON-INFERENCE
Conceptually, in a system that is non-inference secure, any observation is con-
sistent either with H and L events, or with L events only. Thus, an observer cannot
infer that any information is flowing from an H domain to an L domain. A system
is considered secure if and only if for any legal trace of system events, the trace
that results from the legal trace purged of all H events is still a legal trace of the
system [13]. Formally, a system ES is said to be non-inference secure if
NInf(ES) ≡ ∀τ ∈ Tr, (τ |L∈ Tr) |H= φ (2)
This imposes two conditions on the system. First, for any system trace, the
restriction of the trace to L events alone is also a valid system trace. That is, just by
observing L events, one cannot infer with certainty if a H event occurred. Second,
purging H events from any system trace should yield a valid trace comprising of the
L events.
4.3. NON-DEDUCIBILITY
Non-deducibility ensures that the low-level observability does not deduce the
specific high-level inputs to the system [58]. Formally, a system ES is said to be
non-deducible secure if
ND(ES) ≡ ∀τL, τH ∈ Tr : ∃τ ∈ Tr : τ |L= τL ∧ τ |H∩I= τH . (3)
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A system is considered non-deducible secure if nothing can be deduced about the
sequence of input events, I, in the H domain based only on observation of events in
the L domain. In other words, a system is non-deducible secure if a L observation
is compatible with any H input event [14].
4.4. APPLICABILITY OF TRACE-BASED MODELS TO A CPS
Non-interference, non-inference and non-deducibility are trace based models
in which one verifies the trace equivalence of system’s execution with respect to a
L observer on the same finite sequences. As the complexity of CPS increases, the
possible sequence of events that needs to be verified for trace equivalence grows,
increasing the complexity of confidentiality verification dramatically.
For CPS models, non-interference could be very restrictive since CPSs inher-
ently involve the cyber or physical subjects in the H domain writing to the physical
subjects in the H or L domain. For example, a cyber component issuing a High-level
command to a physical component may result in an observable L event at the neigh-
boring physical component due to physical flow invariant as shown in Figure 4.1. In
this case, non-interference is violated.
H
L
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Withdrawal detected in both pools
Figure 4.1. Non-interference for CPSs
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Non-inference may be too strong in some cases, such as when a system cannot
operate without a H event or where the L inputs result in H outputs. However, for
the case shown in Figure 4.2, if the L events always occur even in the absence of the




Attack diagnosis: downstream level sensors hacked























































Withdrawal detected in both pools
Figure 4.2. Non-inference for CPSs
Non-deducibility security models are used to analyze a system in which H out-
puts are observable. According to McLean [8], if an entire system is non-deducibile
secure, then no L observation of the system will ever acquire any H information
through the system. In Figure 4.3, due to the occurrence of two H input events
simultaneously, an observer cannot deduce any information regarding the high level
inputs from his low level observation.
While non-inference and non-deducibility seem to be attractive models to ana-
lyze the information flow within a CPS, their limitation to trace based systems can
be overcome by applying them to different behaviors of a CPS. Verifying that a CPS
preserves a specific information flow property, requires a formal description of the
system.
To perform security analysis of a CPS, a specification system similar to SPA
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Withdrawal detected in both pools
Figure 4.3. Non-deducibility for CPSs
security domains within, to determine potential violation of information flow prop-
erties. Different information flow properties were discussed in literature, that define
how information may not flow between different security domains to preserve confi-
dentiality. In SPA (CCS) and pi-calculus, however, these properties are defined by
exploiting the behavioral equivalence between processes as observed by the low-level
observer. The bisimulation-based non-deducibility on composition (BNDC) property
defined in Section 4.5 ensures that every state (characterized by different system be-
haviors) reachable by the system satisfies the basic non-deducibility property.
4.5. BISIMULATION-BASED NON-DEDUCIBILITY ON
COMPOSITION
Checking confidentiality in a CPS requires an exhaustive verification of all pos-
sible system behaviors to detect the interactions that do not satisfy the desired secu-
rity properties. A system is considered to satisfy bisimulation-based non-deducibility
on composition (BNDC) if it can preserve its security after composition with other
processes [47] [48] [59]. BNDC property uses weak bisimulation equivalence defined
in Definition 1, to detect the behaviors that are not non-deducible secure on compo-
sition with a high level process.
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Definition 1 (Weak Bisimulation). A binary relation R ⊆ EXE is a weak bisimu-
lation if (P,Q) ∈ R implies, for all a ∈ Act,
• if P a−→ P’, then there exists Q’ such that Q a−→ Q’ and (P’, Q’) ∈ R
• if Q a−→ Q’, then there exists P’ such that P a−→ P’ and (P’, Q’) ∈ R
Two processes P, Q ∈ E are weakly bisimilar, denoted by P ≈ Q, if there exists a
weak bisimulation relation R containing the pair (P, Q).
A system ES is BNDC if, for every H process, Π, a L observation cannot
distinguish ES from the process ES composed with any other process, Π. In other
words, a system ES is BNDC if a L observation is not modified by composing any
H process, Π with ES. Formally,
BNDC(ES) ≡ ∀Π ∈ EH , ES\H ≈B (ES|Π)\H (4)
where ES\H changes all the H events in ES into internal silent actions and ≈B is
a weak bisimulation relation. A system is BNDC-preserving if the above property
holds for all possible system behaviors. A broad study of BNDC and its variants is
presented in [60]. Verification of BNDC in a test CPS is presented in Section 6.
4.6. GENERAL APPROACH TO VERIFY INFORMATION FLOW
PROPERTIES IN A CPS
A formal methodology to automate the process of verifying confidentiality of
information flow within a CPS involves addressing three main issues below:
4.6.1. Representation of Cyber and Physical Processes and Their
Interactions in a Computational Framework. A process algebra can be used
to model the CPS as a composition of cyber and physical processes that communi-
cate concurrently, if possible, in a synchronized manner. Each process is defined as
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a sequence of events within the system which determine different states the system
could transition into. In [22], SPA has been used to represent the physical actions
interacting with the computational elements in a gas pipeline network. A similar
approach has been taken in [17], to analyze information flow within a more com-
plex smart grid that uses advanced distributed algorithms to manage the underlying
physical resources like renewable energy sources, house loads, power storage, etc.
The physical network in a CPS forms a continuous time subsystem and the com-
putational part forms a discrete event subsystem. Process algebras are not equipped
to model the continuous-time nature of physical processes in a CPS. To capture the
information flow of the combined system thereby forces the modeling of the con-
tinuous physical subsystem to be event-based, so that the physical events can be
captured using process algebra. Physical events include 1) a local state change of
the physical subsystem resulting from a cyber component controlling it (for example,
a power flow controller increases/decreases voltage on the power line causing a flow
change) or 2) a local physical state change brought by the dynamics of the physi-
cal network (for example, load on a power line increases/decreases as a stochastic
process to which the power electronics react by making a setting). Invariance on
physical flow can be modeled such that events that change the flow at various phys-
ical components are reflected in an aggregate flow that satisfies the invariant. The
impact of physically observable behavior cannot be ignored to study information flow
in CPSs. This forces the observable actions to be considered as events that are used
as building blocks of process specification.
Cyber events within a CPS involve in distributed computation based on 1)
communication with other cyber components or 2) communication with the physical
component that it controls. Composition of cyber processes result in the transfor-
mation of complementary actions of the processes into internal silent actions in the
composed process, defined by the SPA Communication operator in Figure 3.1.
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The communication between physical processes is different from that between
cyber processes; in the former case, the pair of processes make a synchronized phys-
ical change on the shared network (such as power transfer on the shared power bus
from a component with high potential to a component with lower potential) and in
the latter case, the pair of processes synchronize on complementary request/response
type messages. Methods to counter interception of messages on the communica-
tion channel exist, validating the assumption that cyber processes can be securely
composable as long as they perform complementary actions. By contrast, physical
change between two physical processes is observable by an intermediary in the path of
their direct communication, making it difficult to securely model such composition.
Using the proposed approach, CPSs can be modeled in terms of SPA followed by
bisimulation-based equivalence testing of the processes as outlined in Section 4.6.2.
4.6.2. Adequacy of Bisimulation-Based Non-deducibility Properties
for CPS Models. According to the definition of BNDC (in Equation 4), the SPA
specification of the system has to be composed with all the high-level processes
(Π) that can be modeled using the high-level actions of the system. However, this
would significantly increase the complexity of verification of BNDC property since
it should be verified that E\H ≈B (E|Π)\H, for all Π (Π could be defined as some
combination of events from {H ∪ H¯} reaching possibly any state E ′ ∈ ξ, where ξ is
the set of all the states of the system). To avoid such universal quantification on Π,
a strong form of BNDC called strong BNDC (or SBNDC) has been proposed in [60].
SBNDC states that iff for all E ′ reachable from E, if E ′ h∈H−−→ E ′′, then E ′\H ≈B
E ′′\H. This definition of SBNDC implies that the system before and after executing
a high-level action remains indistinguishable.
Such a definition avoids the fact that the property should hold for all possible
high-level processes within the system, transforming the bisimulation relation be-
tween E and E|Π into a bisimulation up to H relation on E and E\H i.e., it will
34
be verified if E ≈\H E\H with the high actions replaced with silent internal action,
τ . The bisimulation up to H relation for SBNDC (≈0\H) transforms the high-level
events in E ′ into a sequence of ( τ−→)0 or zero actions. An exhaustive study of BNDC
and its variants is presented in [60]. The impact of silent internal actions on weak
bisimulation relation is equivalent to that defined in CCS [16].
4.6.3. Testing for Bisimulation Equivalence of Processes. Two
processes are bisimulation equivalent if there exists a bisimulation relation including
both the processes as a pair. This problem of equivalence testing has been well
studied in literature [50] [51] as a relational coarsest partition (RCP) problem: given
a relation, R (in this case, bisimulation up to H ) and an initial state, E over a global
set of states ξ, find the coarsest stable refinement such that either E ⊆ R−1(E\H) or
E∩R−1(E\H) = φ; if such a stable partition cannot be found, then such a partition
does not exist implying that bisimulation up to H relation does not exist between E
and E\H.
The remainder of this work demonstrates the specification and information flow
verification challenges within CPS infrastructures by applying them to an example
CPS (of Section 5) in Sections 6 and 7.
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5. FREEDM: A TEST CPS
The Free Renewable Electric Energy Delivery and Management (FREEDM) [61]
microgrid is a smart power grid architecture with advanced technologies of the
Solid State Transformer (SST), Distributed Renewable Energy Resource (DRER),
Distributed Energy Storage Device (DESD), and House Load (LOAD) powered with
Distributed Grid Intelligence (DGI) to meet the goals of optimal energy manage-
ment and reliability enhancement. FREEDM is a perfect example of a CPS, since it
includes distributed physical and cyber components that communicate among them-
selves to control the system. The SST and power electronics that embed the DGI
are referred to as an Intelligent Energy Management (IEM) (See Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1. FREEDM microgrid with three nodes
Among various algorithms adopted by the DGI is a Power Management
scheme [20], to efficiently balance power flow for optimal distribution of energy within
the system.
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5.1. DISTRIBUTED POWER MANAGEMENT SCHEME
The power management algorithm in the FREEDM system draws its origins
from distributed load balancing schemes [62] in computer science, that are designed
to normalize the loads of process execution among the peers of a distributed system.
Intuitively, the nodes participating in a load balancing algorithm communicate their
load changes with each other in an attempt to migrate the process execution task
from a node with Demand to a node with Supply. The result of such a migration
is that the nodes normalize their loads, thereby achieving a roughly balanced load
computation. Every IEM computes the SST’s actual load on the distribution grid
and decides the state of a node as having Supply or Demand or Normal state
of load. The algorithm consists of concurrent sub-processes with message passing
communication among the IEMs on critical load changes. Each DGI maintains a
(potentially out-of-date) Load table as shown in Table 5.1, to store information it
receives about other nodes in the system. Load table updating strategies are adopted
Table 5.1. Load table maintained at each node
Node State Node State . . Node State
1 Supply 1 Supply . . 1 Normal
2 Demand 2 Demand . . 2 Demand
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
n Supply n Supply . . n Normal
At IEM 1 At IEM 2 . . At IEM n
to minimize cyber message traffic during frequent load changes. An IEM node, on
entering into a Supply state, advertises a Draft Request message to the nodes in
its load table that are in Demand state and waits for response. A Demand node, on
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receiving a Draft Request message, responds to the sender by sending its demand
cost with a special message called Draft Age. The Supply node, on receiving Draft
ages from different Demand nodes, will compute a Draft Standard which is an
optimized selection of the node it is going to supply power to by evaluation of factors
like its own predicted need, economics and other optimization metrics. The Supply
node, on computation of draft standard, sends a unique Draft Select message and
initiates the power migration by making a set point on the Gateway power which
is the local SST’s individual contribution on to the shared power bus. On receiving
the Draft Select message from the Supply node, the IEM which was in demand
receives this power from the shared bus. The migration takes place in unit step size
until the time the Supply node can supply to the Demand node or the Demand
node meets its sufficient demand, or there is a change of load state in either of the
nodes. The algorithm continues until all the nodes are in Normal state. A sample
DGI trace involving a drafting node (which can Supply) and the source (which is in
Demand) is shown below:
DGI_Source: Respond to bid request
if loaded
DGI_Source: Responds to select message
and commands local SST
DGI_Draft: Request bid from known loaded DGIs
DGI_Draft: Order the response messages arbitrarily
DGI_Draft: Selects power to migrate based on cost
DGI_Draft: Sends select message and commands
local SST
5.2. NEED FOR INFORMATION FLOW ANALYSIS OF FREEDM
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) identifies that con-
fidentiality is an increasing concern in smart grids to protect i) the privacy of the
consumer, ii) the electric market information and iii) the power company [25]. Rea-
sons that pose additional risk include increased entry points for potential adversaries
with increased complexity of the grid, and the impact of coordinated cyber-physical
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attacks. Unrestricted information flow can potentially be used against the system for
economic gains; for example, generators of renewable energy may withhold power to
sell at a premium. The physical components that are exposed to any observer out-
side the CPS divulge some information regarding the system (physically observable
behavior). For example, the operation of a wind turbine in a smart grid depends on
its physical size, velocity of wind, etc., that are observable. Definitions of H and L
domains change according to the physical location of the observer on the CPS; for
example, an observer controlling a physical component knows more about the system
than an external observer (with only physical observability). If a user has access to
the Load table of his DGI, then he knows the demand states of his peers. Such a user
can obtain critical information pertaining to the rest of the system by observing the
cyber-physical interactions or faking his demand state, thereby violating confiden-
tiality. To completely analyze the information flow, various cases of such observers
should be accounted for, that reveal the extent of confidentiality violation within
the system [17] as in Figure 5.2. Such models of information flow are discussed in
Section 6.2.
Figure 5.2. Different levels of confidentiality violation possible in a CPS
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6. INFORMATION FLOW ANALYSIS USING SPA
A subnetwork of the FREEDM system with three nodes is depicted in Fig-
ure 6.1. The events in the system are DRER, DESD, Load, Bus, XSST , Gateway
and Utility which are the actions associated with DRER, state of DESD, house
load, the total power on the shared power bus, strategy of the SST for local man-
agement at the node level and activity on utility grid respectively. For notational
convenience, the events are italicized to distinguish them from their respective phys-
ical components (for example, DRER is the physical component while DRER is a






















Figure 6.1. FREEDM subsystem with no DGI, two nodes and two observers
Lemma 1. Power flow in the shared power bus is an invariant function of individual
gateway loads of the participating nodes and the draw from, or contribution to, the
utility grid.
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Proof. Assuming the utility grid to be an infinite source and sink of power, the power




PGateway + PUtility (5)
where n is the number of nodes and PUtility is the total power draw from or contribu-
tion to the utility grid. This is obvious since the flow in the subnetwork is preserved
due to Kirchoff’s current laws. The net demand or supply on the bus is compensated
as a net draw from or contribution to the utility grid, respectively.
6.1. MODELING OF FREEDM USING SPA
Each node without the DGI process is modeled as in Equation 6. The invariant
on the bus shown in Equation 5 can be modeled as in Equation 7. The microgrid
consisting of n such nodes can be modeled as in Equation 8.




Bus ∼= (GatewayNode 1.Bus+GatewayNode 2.Bus+ ....
GatewayNode n.Bus) + Utility.Bus
(7)
E ∼= (Node 1noDGI |Node 2noDGI |...|Node nnoDGI)|Bus (8)
6.2. VERIFICATION OF INFORMATION FLOW USING SPA
Information flows in different ways depending on the observer’s level of inter-
action with the system as shown below.
6.2.1. External Observer on the Physical System. The external
observer can know visible information about the DRER like the size of the facility,
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weather factors impacting the DRER output (represented by DRER), but not the
output energy generated at any given instance of time (DRER). As in Figure 6.1,
the external observer could use an inductive pickup to obtain the reading on the
shared power bus or the gateway at each node, since the power lines are physically
visible and open. The following conclusions can be made on the information flow in
the case of such an observer.
Lemma 2. A single node in the system without DGI is BNDC-secure with respect
to a low-level external observer with limited physical observability.
Proof. Assuming that the low-level observer can only observe the visible DRER
sources, the classification of events at any node as defined in Equation 6 is Low =
{DRER}, High = {DRER, DESD, Load, XSST , DESD, Load, Gateway}. Re-
stricting all the high level events within the node yields, NodenoDGI\H ∼= DRER.
NodenoDGI . For any high level process Π, say Bus, the restriction on the composed
system, (NodenoDGI |Π)\H ∼= DRER.NodenoDGI . Therefore, NodenoDGI\H ≈B
(NodenoDGI |Π)\H.
Lemma 3. A single node in the system without DGI is NOT BNDC-secure with
respect to a low-level external observer that can read the gateway at the node.
Proof. Assuming that the low-level observer can observe the visible DRER sources as
well as the Gateway, the classification of events at any node as defined in Equation 6
is Low = {DRER, Gateway}, High = {DRER, DESD, Load, XSST , DESD,
Load}. Restricting all the high level events within the node yields, NodenoDGI\H ∼=
{DRER}. For any high level process, Π ≡ Bus, the restriction of the composed
system, (NodenoDGI |Π)\H ∼= {DRER,Gateway}. Therefore, NodenoDGI\H ≈B
(NodenoDGI |Π)\H.
An interesting observation in addition to Lemma 3 is that the process satisfies
non-deducibility property. The observer might see a different output of gateway
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(Gateway) every time a high level process, Π ≡ Bus takes place within the system.
However, the observer cannot deduce anything about the high level inputs to the
system since a gateway change might be because of any of the high level inputs
{DRER, DESD, Load} or a combination of them.
Theorem 1. The physical system in FREEDM is BNDC-secure with respect to a
low-level external observer as shown in Figure 6.1.
Proof. From Lemmas 2 and 3, it follows that low-level observation on DRER is
BNDC-secure while an additional observation on gateway at an individual node is
not. However, when composed with the bus as in Equation 8, the system satisfies the
BNDC property. Assuming that the low-level observer can observe the visible DRER
sources as well as the Bus, the classification of events within the system as defined
in Equation 8 is Low = {DRERni=1, Bus}, High = {Node 1noDGI , Node 2noDGI ...
Node nnoDGI , Utility}. Restricting all the high level events within the system yields,
E\H ∼= {DRERni=1, Bus}. For any high level process Π, say, Gateway1.Gateway2,
the high-level restriction on the composed system, (NodenoDGI |Π) \H ∼= {DRERni=1,






′ + Utility′. Therefore, E\H ≈B (E|Π)\H.
Given that the observer can observe all the gateway loads, the observer can
match every unique Gateway event with a corresponding Bus event, thereby di-
vulging the confidentiality of the system. In that case, restricting all the high level
events within the system yields, E\H ∼= {DRERni=1, Gatewayni=1, Bus}. For Π ≡
Utility implying the case when a node draws from or sheds excess power to the
utility, (NodenoDGI |Π)\H ∼= DRERni=1, Gateway′i, Bus′} where Bus′ is inconsistent
with the event, Bus. In that case, the system is not BNDC-secure.
6.2.2. Internal Observer on the Physical System. If the nodes are
not involved in the DGI power balancing process, the low-level internal observer as
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shown in Figure 6.1, who is a part of the physical grid, can observe a change on
the shared power bus, whenever a Supply node renders its excess generation to the
utility grid or a Demand node ‘absorbs’ power from the utility grid. However, the
observer cannot exactly know who performed the change. Therefore, it can be said
that the system without the DGI process is non-deducible secure. This leads to the
following Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. The system without the DGI process is non-deducible secure.
Proof. The change observed by the low-level observer on the shared power bus, Bus′
could be due to any of the other nodes that are in Demand or Supply. The observer
would be in doubt as to who performed the event or if more than one of the nodes
performed it. The observer could not deduce the high level inputs to the system
from the low level observation. This makes the system non-deducible secure.
Theorem 2. The physical system in FREEDM is BNDC-secure with respect to a
low-level internal observer as shown in Figure 6.1.
Proof. Assuming that the low-level internal observer, IO can observe the visible
DRER sources as well as the Bus, the classification of events within the system as
defined in Equation 8 is Low = {DRERni=1, Node IOnoDGI , Bus, GatewayNode IO},
High = {Node 1noDGI , Node 2noDGI ... Node nnoDGI}. Restricting all the high
level events within the system yields, E\H ∼= {DRERni=1, Node IOnoDGI , Bus,
GatewayNode IO}. For any high level process Π, say, Gatewayi.Gatewayj where
i, j 6= IO the high-level restriction on the composed system, E|Π)\H ∼= {DRERni=1,
Node IOnoDGI , Bus, GatewayNode IO}. As with the case with external observer in




′+Utility′. Therefore, E\H ≈B (E|Π)\H.
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6.2.3. Internal Observer Without DGI, on the Physical System
Composed With DGI. The system composed with power balancing process pre-
serves non-deducibility. Intuitively, this is possible due to the invariance of physical
flow (Equation 5). The nodes participating in power management process make their
changes in such a way that the net power flow at the bus remains constant. This
case was proved in an earlier work [24] using a gas pipeline system as test case. The
nodes running the power management process, LB (defined in Equation 9) can be
represented as in Equation 10.
LB ∼= LBS + LBD (9)
LBS ∼= SendDraftRequest.LBS +ReceiveDraftAge.LBS+
ComputeDraftStandard.DraftSelect.LBS.τ.XSST .LB
LBD ∼= ReceiveDraftRequest.LBD + SendDraftAge.LBD+
AcceptDraft.LBD.τ.XSST .LB
IEM ∼= (DRER.DRER.IEM +DESD.IEM + Load.IEM).τ.LB.
(DESD.IEM + Load.IEM +Gateway.IEM)
(10)
E = (IEM 1|IEM 2|..|IEM n)|Node IOnoDGI |Bus (11)
The system composed with the DGI process, E can be defined as in Equa-
tion 11. Assuming that the low-level internal observer, IO can observe the visible
DRER sources, the classification of events within the system as defined in Equa-
tion 11 is Low = {DRERni=1, Node IOnoDGI , GatewayNode IO}, High = {IEM 1,
IEM 2 ... IEM n}.
Theorem 3. The system composed with the DGI process, as modeled in Equation 11
satisfies the BNDC property with respect to an internal observer without DGI.
45
Proof. An internal observer without DGI cannot see the high-level message ex-
changes associated with the DGI processes. Given this, it is unaware of any power
migration due to the power management algorithm. The high-level restriction on
the system is E\H ∼= {DRERni=1, Node IOnoDGI , Bus, GatewayNode IO}. The DGI
power migration step between a Supply node, i and a Demand node, j is represented
as Π ≡ LBSi ||︸︷︷︸
Migrate
LBDj . The high-level restriction on the system composed with
DGI, (E|Π)\H ∼= {DRERni=1, Node IOnoDGI , Bus′, GatewayNode IO}. However,
Bus is consistent with Bus′ due to the invariant defined in Equation 5. The total
power on the bus connecting the three nodes (1, 2, IO) shown in Figure 6.2 is given
by PBus = PGateway1 + PGateway2 + PGatewayIO. As a result of load balancing, if the
migrated power from Node 1 to Node 2 is ζ units (such as watts), then P ′Bus =
(PGateway1 − ζ) + (PGateway2 + ζ) + PGatewayIO. Power losses during migration are
ignored for the sake of simplicity, leading to PBus = P ′Bus. The event Bus
′ could also
be due to any process, (for instance Gatewayi.Gatewayj as in Theorem 2) where
i, j 6= IO. Therefore E\H ≈B (E|Π)\H, making the system BNDC-secure.
6.2.4. Internal Observer With DGI, on the System Composed With
DGI. For an internal observer with DGI (Node 3) as shown in Figure 6.2, if Node
1 is in Supply state, it could be either supplying to Node 2 or selling power to the
utility grid. On the other hand, if Node 2 is in Demand state, it is either receiving
power from Node 1 or receiving from utility grid. Such an observer can infer about
the global state of the system by analyzing the load table traces that are updated
within its DGI process. A load table trace at every node (as shown in Table 5.1), can
be represented in the trace model as a sequence of time varying tuples containing the
state information. For example, =∆t = { (State(Node 1) at time t1,... State(Node






























Figure 6.2. FREEDM subsystem with DGI, two nodes and two observers
observer’s view of the system changes depending on the current demand state of the
node, leading to different cases of information flow as below.
6.2.5. Observer in Demand State. From its load table trace, an observer
can see the nodes that are in Demand state and Supply state. The quantity of
information that is observable is more in this case, since it receives draft requests
from all the nodes that are in Supply state. The observer in Demand state responds
to the draft requests by sending its demand cost (Draft Age). If it receives a
Refusal, it could be because the Supply node it responded to, has an inadequate
matching cost to satisfy its requirement, or the Supply node has selected to draft
with another Demand node which has a higher demand cost. In the case with only
three IEMs, this doubt can be resolved as follows: If there is no other Demand node
that the observer can see, then the Supply node does not have enough power to
match its requirement. In this case, it can advertise a lesser cost until the time it
succeeds. However, at the time it succeeds, it now has an estimate of the excess
power the Supply node has, with which it can infer its Load.
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Theorem 4. The DGI power management process is not BNDC-secure with respect
to an internal observer in Demand state.
Proof. Let Π be a power migration step between IEM1 and IEM2 as shown in Equa-
tion 9. From its load table trace =t ={(Supply,Demand)t}, IEM3 initiates the
high-level power balancing process Π′ with IEM1. It advertises a cost, ˆCost3 and
experiences a refusal, R that is a function of the advertised cost. Within the system
defined in Equation 11, E, the following takes place:






(IEM 1|IEM 2|IEM 3|Π)\H ∼= {=t, Bus′, Gateway3}
(IEM 1|IEM 2|IEM 3|Π|Π′)\H ∼= {=t, Bus′, Gateway3, ˆCost3,R}
The proof can easily be extended to n IEMs in the system to prove that
(E|Π)\H 6≈B (E|Π|Π′)\H. Hence the system is not BNDC-secure with respect to
an internal observer in Demand state.
Alternatively, the observer, on experiencing a Refusal of its Draft Age, can
bid a higher cost until the time it receives a Draft Select, meaning that it is selected
by the Supply node to draft. In this case, cost of the other Demand node is divulged,
along with interference of high level activity between the Demand node and the
Supply node.
6.2.6. Observer in Supply State. The observer in Supply state can have
information on the nodes that are in Demand state, with certainty. It initiates the
Draft Request to obtain the Draft ages from the Demand nodes which include
their respective demands. It is possible that the Demand nodes experience a refusal,
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R since the observer is not actually ready for migration. The observer can continue
this process of issuing fake draft requests resulting in the Demand node, not satis-
fying its request from any other IEMs in supply state. However, this case can be
handled by not accepting any draft requests from the presumably supplying node
after a certain number of refusals. Along with the low level physical observation
and the demands advertised by the Demand nodes, the observer can infer critical
information about DESD, Loads and strategy of SST at the Demand node.
Theorem 5. The DGI power management process is not BNDC-secure with respect
to an internal observer with DGI in Supply state.
Proof. Based on its load table trace =t ={(Demand,Demand)t}, IEM3 initiates
the load balancing process Π′ with IEM1 and 2. Both the IEMs in Demand state
respond with costs ˆCost1 and ˆCost2 respectively, revealing their demand. The proof
is similar to Theorem 4.
(IEM 1|IEM 2|IEM 3)\H ∼= {=t, Bus′, Gateway3}
(IEM 1|IEM 2|IEM 3|Π′)\H ∼= {=t, Bus′, Gateway3, ˆCost1, ˆCost2}
The proof can be extended to n nodes in the micro grid leading to the conclusion
that E\H 6∼= (E|Π′)\H. This proves that the system does not satisfy BNDC property
with respect to an internal observer in Supply state.
6.2.7. Verification of a Single Node Involved in Power Migration
Step. The system shown in Figure 6.3 is composed of three residential nodes
(that include SST, DRER and DESD) with each running DGI and tied to the utility
grid. However, the information flow analysis presented in the rest of this section is
for a primitive FREEDM system that includes a single residential node running DGI
and connected to the utility. It is verified whether this primitive system satisfies the
SBNDC property with respect to a low-level observer. The events that take place
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in FREEDM system (shown in Figure 6.3) can be classified for simplicity, into the
following classes:
Events at a given cyber process (DGI, represented as Cyber):
RS: Read local physical state, CO: Compute,
IC: Issue command to a local physical controller (SST),
Send: Send message to peer cyber components,
Recv: Receive message from peer cyber components.
Events at a given physical process (represented as Physical):
IN : Flow change preserving the invariant on the bus,
PO: Physical Observability,
SC: Local state change (due to stochastic usage of resources involving DRERs,
DESDs, LOADs),
EC: Execute command from cyber component (DGI).
Figure 6.3. Events within the FREEDM system
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IC, EC are complementary Input/Output pair. Similarly, SC and RS form a
complementary I/O pair. For an observer internal to the system, the events can be
classified as, High = { RS, CO, IC, EC, SC, Send} and Low = {PO, IN , Recv}.
The system can be built up in a bottom-up fashion as a composition of processes
performing these events, as shown in Equations 12 through 16.
Cyber ∼= RS.CO.IC.Cyber +RS.CO.Send.Cyber +Recv.CO.IC.Cyber (12)
Physical ∼= PO.SC.IN.Physical + PO.EC.Physical (13)
Node ∼= Cyber|Physical (14)
Invariant ∼= (IN1.Invariant+ IN2.Invariant...) + τ.Invariant (15)
System,E ∼= (Node1|Node2...)|Invariant (16)
The procedure to verify whether this system satisfies SBNDC is as follows:
Unwinding E in terms of the events that define it and using the definition of com-
position, a possible state E ′ (such that E → E ′) can be defined as:




E ′\H ∼=PO.τ.Node+Recv.τ.Node (18)
E ′ ≈0\HPO.τ.Node+Recv.τ.τ.τ.PO.Node (19)
51
The bisimulation up to H on E ′ yields the relation shown in Equation 19. From
Equations 18 and 19, E ′ 6≈0\H E ′\H. This proves that the generic CPS defined above
does not satisfy SBNDC. This verification process can be automated by encoding
the SPA formalism of the system into a model checking framework that is capable
of verifying BNDC properties (E.g: CoPS [63]).
The trace that resulted in the failure of SBNDC is Recv.τ.SC.τ.PO.Node
implying that on receiving a message, the Node performs an internal action, a
State Change event, followed by an internal action to maintain the Invariant which
is physically observable (for example, due to the voltage drop at a node on the power
line, a small change is observed by a neighboring node sharing the physical line). In
practice, such a physical change can be hidden through coordination with other nodes
in which the following takes place: if one node makes a change, the other node(s)
perform(s) a compensating event [24] [64]. This process E ′ can now be made SB-
NDC by adding a complementary PO event such that the effect of the PO event
is nullified. Therefore, the system trace Recv.τ.SC.τ.PO.Node in Equation 17 can
be modified as Recv.τ.SC.τ.PO.PO.Node ∼= Recv.τ.SC.τ.τ.Node. The modified E ′
will have the following characteristics.
E ′Modified\H ∼= PO.τ.Node+Recv.τ.Node (20)
E ′Modified ≈0\HPO.τ.Node+Recv.τ.Node (21)
Thus, E ′Modified satisfies the SBNDC property. Similarly, it is verified for every
E ′ reachable from E whether E ′ and E ′\H belong to the bisimulation up to H
relation. The possibility of multiple observers coordinating in an effort to deduce
more information pertaining to the system is a challenging task that needs to be
well addressed. Thus, the SBNDC property and its weak forms are sufficient for CPS
verification (in many cases). This process reduces the problem of verifying the BNDC
property on the SPA model of the CPS into verifying a bisimulation relation between
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all the reachable states of the system. The problem of verifying the bisimulation
equivalence between E and E\H is the next logical step to perform complete system
evaluation. In Figure 6.4, part(a) demonstrates the RCP formulation of the primitive
FREEDM system in Equations 17 to 19; part(b) demonstrates the RCP formulation
of the modified FREEDM system in Equations 20 and 21.
Figure 6.4. Relational coarsest partition formulation of FREEDM
In Figure 6.4(a), the partition including the state E ′\H is unstable with respect
to the partition containing E ′ (neither E ′ ⊆ R−1(E ′\H) nor E ′∩R−1(E ′\H) = φ) due
to the transitions including PO event. This implies that there are some states of the
system (brought about by high-level transitions) that are distinguishable with respect
to the low-level observer‘s view (E ′\H). However, in the modified FREEDM system,
as demonstrated in Figure 6.4(b), the partition including the state E ′Mod\H is stable
with respect to the partition containing E ′Mod. This follows from the fact that the
observer can only see either the states of the system brought about by the low-level
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transitions or those states with high-level transitions transformed into internal τs (by
the relation ≈0\H). Thus this captures the idea that the low-level observer cannot
distinguish between E ′mod and E ′mod\H. Such a verification for coarsest partition
over bisimulation up to H is performed for all the states E ′ ∈ ξ : E → E ′, with
respect to E ′\H.
6.3. RESULTS WITH AUTOMATED VERIFICATION OF SBNDC
ON FREEDM
Using the automated BNDC verifier, Checker of Persistent Security (CoPS) [63],
the results obtained for the FREEDM system are tabulated in Table 6.1. The table
shows whether each process of the FREEDM system satisfies SBNDC property or
not. For each process, the graph generated indicates the state transitions of that
process. Intuitively, these results suggest that DGI satisfies SBNDC properties as-
suming secure communications between various interacting processes. However, the
components on the physical network that are inherently exposed fail to satisfy SB-
NDC and so is their composition with DGI. The modified microgrid in the example
presented in Section 6.2.7 satisfies SBNDC due to the compensating event hiding
the observable physical events.
The graph generated for each process in Table 6.1 suggests the complexity
involved in exploring a large number of states (every E ′) to verify SBNDC. The
verification of equivalence between E ′ and E ′\H, adds to the existing complexity.
The states explored to verify the bisimulation equivalence using the Paige-Tarjan
algorithm for equivalence testing [50] on the FREEDM system is 1339888. These
results were generated using a computer with Intel Core 2 Duo processor having
2.4 GHz and 2GB memory running Mac OS X 10.5. The time taken was around 15
minutes and 30 seconds. The efficiency of equivalence testing can be improved by the
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Table 6.1. Model checking results for the micro grid consisting of a single node
Process SBNDC GeneratedGraph Complexity
MicroGrid: Node | DGI | Bus No V:3616,E:26543 15.5 Mins
MicroGrid (Modified) Yes V:5416,E:38641 13.9 Mins
Node: SST | DRER | DRES | Load No V:241,E:1120 -
DGI Yes V:5, E:8 -
Bus (Invariant) No V:3, E:3 -
development of algorithms that minimize the state space using advanced techniques
of bisimulation and partial order reduction, as in [65].
The analysis using SPA has been a preliminary step in identifying a generic
approach to model and verify CPSs. However, some limitations exist, particularly in
modeling distributed message passing. In some CPSs like FREEDM, the communi-
cation links are dynamic in nature given the state-driven message passing initiated
by the nodes. In SPA, there is no means to distinguish messages with same names
originating from different nodes. To this end, the pi-calculus has been adopted to
overcome these limitations to model distributed communication.
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7. INFORMATION FLOW ANALYSIS USING pi-CALCULUS
In this section, the FREEDM system running DGI is modeled in the pi-calculus
framework to overcome the limitations incurred using SPA. Primarily, two aspects
were ignored in the previous section- i) the private communication among peers
based on demand state, and ii) distinguishing messages with same name originating
from different peers based on channels of communication. In Figure 7.1, IEM3
which was in Supply initially involves in private communication with the Demand
node, IEM1. However, IEM3 transitions from a Supply state to a Demand state,
thereby establishing communication with a new Supply node, IEM2. Likewise, the
communication structure changes based on the demand status of the nodes. This




Figure 7.1. Need for scope extrusion in FREEDM
In pi-calculus, the communication structure among existing processes can change
over time. Dynamic communication (link mobility) among the peers can be repre-
sented using two features - i) restriction of a message to be sent or received over a
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communication channel, and ii) scope extrusion. Scope extrusion allows the abstrac-
tion of the dynamically changing scope of the communication domain, by sending
channel names as messages to processes that did not have access to those channels
before. The pi-calculus offers other useful features such as abstractions to model
adversarial behavior, different notions of process equivalences to define different no-
tions of security. These features are applied in the FREEDM system specification
presented in this section.
7.1. MODELING OF FREEDM USING pi-CALCULUS
Algorithm 1 presents the DGI power management algorithm that will be veri-
fied in composition with the system. In this section, an approach similar to [66] is
considered, in which peer to peer algorithms were modeled using the pi-calculus to
verify their functional correctness.
Algorithm 1: DGI power management algorithm





if Recv (“Draft Request”) then
Send (“Draft Response”)
end if






Broadcast to Demand nodes (“Draft Request”)
if Recv(“Draft Response”) then
Send (“Draft Select”)
end if





In Figure 7.2, the modeling of a node running DGI is depicted as a composition
of pi processes. To facilitate modeling of distributed communication among various
components within a node and with peer nodes, a number of channels are assumed
to terminate/start from their respective ports. The ports e1, e2, e3 represent the ter-
minals of the dedicated channels used to communicate the demand states (Normal,
Supply, Demand respectively) of each node as messages sent or received by the DGI
process. Similarly, m1,m2,m3,m4 serve as the terminal ports of the channels ded-
icated for the four kinds of power management messages. The sl, sg, sr, ss are the
ports to communicate with the local devices (LOAD, SST, Renewable and Storage
respectively). Unique identifiers (UUIDs) are assumed to be in place to label the








































Figure 7.2. pi-characterization of a cyber-physical process
The physical system can be similarly defined as a network of components that
interact over channels. Equations 22 to 28 represent the formal specifications of the
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FREEDM system. Equation 22 represents the modeling of the DGI power manage-
ment algorithm of Algorithm 1. In Equation 23, Ω represents a power migration
step between a pair of nodes (in supply and demand states respectively), initiated
after successful DGI negotiations. The operation of physical components at each
node (including SST, DRER, DESD and LOAD) is abstracted to that of sending
and receiving a vector of corresponding power settings, as in Equation 24. The in-
variant acting on the bus can be developed inductively for n nodes in the system as
in Equation 25. This invariant captures the invariance of power flow acting on the
bus, following Kirchoff’s current laws.
DGI(idx, ~m,~e, ~sx, ~statex) ,
sx(~sx).τ. ¯statex < ~state > .DGI(idx, ~m,~e, ~sx, ~statex) + ex(e~y).τ.
DGI(idx, ~m,~e, ~sx, ~statex) + statex(SND).if SND = Supply
then {SND/Supply}.m¯d1 < mx1 > .Ω(idx, idd) + statex(SND).
if SND = Demand then {SND/Demand}.e¯x < e~y3 > .DGI(idx, ~m,






















x < ~sx > .0+ statex(SND).









x < ~sx > .0
(23)
PHY (idx, ~sx) ,
τ.sx(~sx). ¯bus < sxg > .PHY (id
x, ~sx) + s¯x < ~sx > .τ.PHY (idx, ~sx)
(24)
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INV (~δ, n) ,∏
i∈n
bus(sig).grid(u).INV (





INV (~δ, n), where |n| = #Nodes.
(25)






~δ, 3) + ¯grid < u > .
¯bus < s1g + δ
1 > . ¯bus < s2g + δ
2 > . ¯bus < s3g + δ
3 > .INV (~δ, 3)
(26)
Node(idx, ~m,~e, ~sx, ~statex) ,
DGI(idx, ~m,~e, ~sx, ~statex)|PHY (idx, ~sx)
(27)
System, S ,
Node(id1, ~m,~e, ~s1, ~state1)|Node(id2, ~m,~e, ~s2, ~state2)|......|
Node(idn, ~m,~e, ~sn, ~staten)|INV (~δ, n)
(28)
7.2. INFORMATION FLOW PROPERTIES IN pi-CALCULUS
Non-interference was previously studied in terms of bisimulation semantics, in
the typed pi-calculus framework in [67] and [68]. In this work, the non-deducibility
property presented in pi-calculus is based on the behavioral equivalence, the reduc-
tion closed barbed congruence [69]. The security requirement is to preserve the
non-deducibility of cyber-physical activity involving the power migrations between
various supply and demand nodes, with respect to an observer process that could be
a legitimate node in the system as shown in Figure 7.3. The proofs presented rely on
the idea of context which is fundamental in abstracting the environment with which


















Figure 7.3. An observer process interacting with FREEDM
Definition 2 (Context). A context, C is a subprocess given by the grammar in pi-
calculus, that defines the environment of the system in which the hole or place holder
can be replaced with an observer process.
C :: [.] | pi.C[.]+M | νaC[.] | C[.]|P | !C[.], where P is a process within the system.
Definition 3 (Barbed Bisimilarity). Two processes, P and Q are barbed bisimilar,
(P ≈˙Q), if
1) P ↓µ implies Q ⇓µ and vice-versa.
2) P τ−→ P ′ implies Q τ−→ Q′ and vice-versa.
In Definition 3, P ↓µ implies that P can perform any input action with subject
µ. Q ⇓µ implies that Q performs the actions with subject µ with prefixed and suffixed
number of τ actions (Q τ∗−→ µ−→ τ∗−→).
Definition 4 (Reduction Closed Barbed Congruence). Two processes, P and Q are
reduction closed barbed congruent, (P '˙cQ), if
1) they are barbed bisimilar i.e., P ≈˙ Q and
2) C[P] ≈˙C[Q], for every context C.
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The definition 5 suggests that the system satisfies Basic pi-ND if the observer
cannot distinguish the system when composed with any high level process, for all
contexts of the system.
Definition 5 (Basic pi-non-deducibility (Basic pi-ND)). A process, P satisfies Basic
pi-ND if P '˙c P |H, where H is a high-level process composed of the names ∈ H.
7.3. VERIFICATION OF INFORMATION FLOW USING
pi-CALCULUS
In Figure 7.3, a simple three node FREEDM system is shown. In order to
verify if information flows from one node to the other during critical operations, an
observer process that is a valid node within the system is considered. Intuitively,
the observer should not be able to distinguish between the contexts that have and
haven’t performed the high-level power migration step. It needs to be established
that Node3 '˙c Node3|H to prove that the system satisfies Basic pi-ND (Definition 5)
with respect to the observer.
7.3.1. Observer (Context) in the System Without DGI. An observer
with no DGI cannot send or receive cyber messages within the system. Conceptually,
Theorem 6 establishes that such an observer in a basic power system cannot deduce
individual power settings.
Theorem 6. The system without DGI is inherently secure with respect to a low-level
observer.
Proof. To prove that Node3 '˙c Node3|H, it is required to establish the following as
defined in Definition 4.
• Node3 ≈˙ Node3|H
• C[Node3] ≈˙ C[Node3|H], for the context C, defined in Equation 29.
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C :: [.]|S (29)
The high-level process in this case is the sequence of settings on the bus, made
by nodes other than the observer. Without DGI, the system with two nodes functions
as:
S ′ , Node(id1, ~s1)|Node(id2, ~s2)|INV (~δ, 3) := (τ. ¯bus < s1g > .S ′ + τ.
bus(s1g).S






2>−−−−−−−→ Sˆ ′, and Node3 ↓ ¯bus<s1g>, ¯bus<s2g> is Null. Simi-
larly, Node3|H := Node3|( ¯bus < s1g + δ1 > | ¯bus < s2g + δ2 >) ⇓ ¯bus<s1g>, ¯bus<s2g> is
Null. Inserting the observer node in the context of Equation 29, the following are
indistinguishable:
C[Node3] := Node3|(τ.τ.grid(u).S ′ + τ.bus(s1g).S ′)|(τ.τ.grid(u).S ′ + τ.
bus(s2g).S
′)|τ.τ.bus(s3g).grid(u).INV (~δ, 3)
C[Node3|H] := Node3|(τ.τ.grid(u).S ′ + τ.bus(s1g + δ1).S ′)|(τ.τ.grid(u).S ′ +
τ.bus(s2g + δ
2).S ′)|τ.τ.bus(s3g).grid(u′).INV (~δ, 3)
Therefore, C[Node3] ↓ ¯bus<s1g>, ¯bus<s2g> ≈˙ C[Node3|H] ⇓ ¯bus<s1g+δ1>, ¯bus<s2g+δ2> and
hence the conclusion, Node3 '˙c Node3|H. Node3 does not observe a change in





g + u = (s1g + δ1) + (s2g + δ2) + s3g + u′.
Assuming nodes 1 and 2 are in supply and demand respectively, the following
conclusions can be made regarding the observability of power migration between
them. Different observations can be drawn depending on the demand state of the
observer.
7.3.2. Observer (Context) in Supply State in the SystemWith DGI.
The observer in supply state, Node3s is first defined in Equation 31, and the context
including this observer is then verified in Theorem 7.
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Node3s , Node(id3, ~m,~e, ~s3, ~state3) := τ.τ. ¯bus < s3g > .τ. ¯state3




{SND/Supply}.m¯21 < m31 > .Node3s + state3(Supply).m32
(m22).Node3s
(31)
Theorem 7. The system is not secure with respect to a low-level observer in supply
state.
Proof.
S ′′ , Node(id1, ~m,~e, ~s1, ~state1)|Node(id2, ~m,~e, ~s2, ~state2)|INV (~δ, 3)
:= τ.τ. ¯bus < s1g > .τ.
¯state1 < ~state1 > .S ′′ + τ.τ. ¯bus < s2g > .τ.
¯state2 < ~state2 > .S ′′ + e1(e~2).τ.S ′′ + state1(Supply).state2
(Demand).τ.τ.S ′′ + state2(Demand).e¯2 < e~13 > .S
′′ + e2(e~1).τ.
S ′′|INV (~δ, 3)
(32)
S ′′|Ω(id1, id2) , Node(id1, ~m,~e, ~s1, ~state1)|Node(id2, ~m,~e, ~s2, ~state2)|
Ω(id1, id2)|INV (~δ, 3) := τ.τ. ¯bus < s1g > .τ. ¯state1 < ~state1 > .S ′′
+ τ.τ. ¯bus < s2g > .τ.
¯state2 < ~state2 > .S ′′ + e1(e~2).τ.S ′′ +




′′ + e2(e~1).τ.S ′′ + νC12(τ.τ.τ.τ.τ.τ.τ.τ).
(τ.τ. ¯bus < s1g > +τ.τ.
¯bus < s2g >).S
′′
(33)
To verify whether Node3s '˙c Node3s|Ω(id1, id2) 1, it is required to establish
the following as defined in Definition 4.
1) Node3s ≈˙ Node3s|Ω12
2) C[Node3s] ≈˙ C[Node3s|Ω12], for the context C, defined in Equation 29.
Trivially, Node3s ≈˙ Node3s|Ω12, because Node3s does not interact with the
process, Ω12. Intuitively, Ω12 involves private communication among nodes 1 and
1Ω(id1, id2) will be used as Ω12 for simplicity.
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2 and issue of commands to their respective physical subsystems, all of which are
invisible to an external observer (Node3s). However, in the context of the whole
system the result is different as shown below in Equations 34 and 35. In Equa-
tion 34, C[Node3s] ↓Ω12 is {e2(e~3)} while C[Node3s|Ω12] ⇓Ω12 (in Equation 35,) is
{e2(e~3), bus(s3g′)}. C[Node3s|Ω12] captures the notion that bus(s1g). bus(s2g). bus(s3g)
takes place on the bus leading to an observable event bus(s3g′).
C[Node3s] , S ′′|Node3s := τ.τ. ¯bus < s1g > .τ. ¯state1 < ~state1 > .C +
τ.τ. ¯bus < s2g > .τ.
¯state2 < ~state2 > .C + e1(e
~2).τ.C + state1






~1).τ.C + τ.τ. ¯bus < s3g > .τ.









3 > .C + τ.τ.
¯bus < s3g′ > .τ.
¯state3
< ~state3 > .C + e3(e
~2).τ.C
(35)
Intuitively, this implies that the observer is able to distinguish the case of a
power migration between nodes 1 and 2 and non-occurence of power migration, by de-
termining that node 2 has recently been in Demand state. Hence Node3s ˙6'c Node3s
|Ω(id1, id2).
7.3.3. Observer (Context) in Demand State in the System With
DGI. The case in which the observer is in Demand state is similar to the case in
which the observer is in Supply state. However, the evaluation context consists of
the observer node in demand state, Node3d.
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Node3d , Node(id3, ~m,~e, ~s3, ~state3) := τ.τ. ¯bus < s3g > .τ. ¯state3













Theorem 8. The system is not secure with respect to a low-level observer in demand
state.
Proof. For the same reason as mentioned in Theorem 7, provingNode3d ≈˙Node3d|Ω12
is trivial, because Node3d does not interact with the process, Ω12.
C[Node3d] , S ′′|Node3d := τ.τ. ¯bus < s1g > .τ. ¯state1 < ~state1 > .C +
τ.τ. ¯bus < s2g > .τ.
¯state2 < ~state2 > .C + e1(e
~2).τ.C + state1






~1).τ.C + τ.τ. ¯bus < s3g > .τ.









3 > .C + τ.τ.
¯bus < s3g′ > .τ.
¯state3
< ~state3 > .C + e3(e
~2).τ.C
(38)
C[Node3d] ↓Ω12 is { e2(e~3), m31(m11)} while C[Node3d|Ω12] ⇓Ω12 is { e2(e~3),
m31(m
1
1), bus(s3g′)}. The context C[Node3d|Ω12] ⇓Ω12 captures the notion that bus(s1g).
bus(s2g).bus(s
3
g) takes place on the bus leading to an observable event bus(s3g′). The
observer is able to distinguish the case of a power migration between nodes 1 and
2 and non-occurence of power migration, by determining that node 1 is in Supply
state and node 2 is in Demand state. Clearly, Node3d ˙6'c Node3d|Ω(id1, id2).
7.3.4. Making the FREEDM System pi-ND-secure. In the previous
sections, it was proved that the FREEDM system is not pi-ND when there are three
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nodes in the system. However, if two other nodes (4 and 5) participate as in Figure 7.4
so that there are two Supply and two Demand nodes, the power migration between


























Supply Supply Demand Demand 
Figure 7.4. An observer process interacting with the 5-node FREEDM system
Theorem 9. The system with five nodes is secure with respect to a low-level observer
in supply state, when more than one power migrations occur in parallel.
Proof. This proof shows that it holds true for the case of five nodes with two power
migrations occurring in parallel since this is a base case. Since five nodes exist,
Equation 32 would now include the invariant for five nodes, i.e., INV (~δ, 5) instead
of INV (~δ, 3). In this case, C[Node3s] ↓Ω12 is {e2(e~1), e2(e~4), e3(e~2), e3(e~5)} and C
[Node3s|Ω12] ⇓Ω12 is {e2(e~1), e2(e~4), e3(e~2), e3(e~5), bus(s3g′)}. The observer at Node3s
cannot deduce from the observation on the bus, bus(s3g′) if a power migration occurred
between the pair of nodes (1, 2) or (4, 5) or both. In this case, Node3s '˙c Node3s
|Ω12. The same conclusion holds for the power migration between nodes 4 and 5, i.e.,
Node3s '˙c Node3s|Ω45. The proof can be extended to the case of more than two
power migrations occurring in the system consisting of more than five nodes.
In the next section, the above results will be verified using automatic equiva-
lence checkers.
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8. AUTOMATIC VERIFICATION USING pi-CALCULUS TOOLS
In this section, the validity of the manual proofs used in the non-deducibility
analysis of the FREEDM system in the pi-calculus framework is verified. Process
algebraic equivalence checkers like Mobility WorkBench [70] and Proverif [71] are
employed to automate the verification process. These tools accept the system speci-
fication in terms of pi-calculus syntax and verifies certain equivalence properties. The
MWB is a tool developed for polyadic pi-calculus and verifies observational equiva-
lence between processes. The pi-ND property used in this analysis however uses a
finer refinement of observational equivalence, the reduction closed barbed congruence
(RCBC) and hence the capability of this tool is limited. However, it can be proved
if the RCBC relation does not apply to two processes by proving that two processes
are not weak observational equivalent. Proverif, on the other hand is more robust
because it accepts the applied pi-calculus specification of the system and provides
in-built commands to verify a number of secrecy properties that are of interest to
CPS analyses. Various analyses of the FREEDM specification is carried out using
each of these tools. It is to be noted that the FREEDM system only serves as a test
example of a complex distributed CPS and the modeling shown below provides the
reader with how this analysis approach can be extended to other CPSs.
8.1. MWB
The Mobility Workbench (MWB) is an automated tool for manipulating and
analyzing mobile concurrent systems specified in pi-calculus. MWB proves that some-
thing is Barbed Bisimilar (BB, ≈˙) but not Reduction Closed Barbed Congruent
(RCBC, '˙c). That is, if two processes P, Q are such that P ≈˙Q , they need not be P
'˙cQ. However, the vice-versa is true. Therefore RCBC is a finer refinement of BB.
68
To verify the weak or observational equivalence, MWB is used as follows:
weq Process1 Process2
The MWB encoding for the FREEDM system is presented in Appendix. The
results obtained for a 3-node and 5-node system are summarized in Table 8.1.
Table 8.1. Basic pi-ND results for observer in supply and demand states using MWB
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Proverif [72] is a tool, primarily intended to verify cryptographic protocols. It
accepts as input, the protocol specification in applied pi-calculus [73] and verifies
claimed security properties. The tool helps uncover potential security violations in
the implementation of cryptographic protocols in the presence of an attacker who
may have complete control over the communication channels. An attacker with such
capability, often referred to as a “Dolev-Yao” [74] attacker, can read, modify and
inject messages into the system. In this work, this tool was used in a different way
to reveal information flow violations in CPS environments by abstracting away, the
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cryptographic primitives defined in the tool language. The verification of pi-ND using
Proverif is inspired from the privacy verification of electronic voting protocol, FOO92
in [75].
8.2.1. pi-ND. The encoding of the FREEDM system in Proverif is shown
in Figures 8.1 to 8.5. The observer is able to break the confidentiality of power
migration among the nodes by distinguishing observer contexts in supply and demand





free delta1, delta2:netValue [private].
Figure 8.1. Defining variables and names to initialize the FREEDM Proverif script
(* Invariant process*)
fun Inv(G):netValue.
reduc forall g:G, value:netValue; sum(Inv(g), value)= value.
Figure 8.2. Proverif process defining the physical invariant of flow
8.2.2. Strong Secrecy. Strong secrecy is preserved when the attacker is
unable to distinguish when the secret changes. With respect to the FREEDM system,
the attacker should not distinguish between the cases when a supply node migrates a
units of power in a single power migration step and b units of power. To perform such
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(* DGI process1 in Supply state *)
let DGI_Supply =
out(c, Status); (*Request sent to only demand nodes*)
out(c, Request);
in(ch, x_Response:bitstring);
if x_Response = Response then
out(ch, choice[Select, Reject]);
in(ch, x_Accept:bitstring);
if x_Accept = Accept then
out(c_phy, Inv(g1));
let y=sum(Inv(g1), delta1) in
out(ch, Set).
Figure 8.3. Proverif process for a DGI node in supply state










let y=sum(Inv(g2), delta2) in
out(ch, Set).
Figure 8.4. Proverif process for a DGI node in demand state
an attack, the attacker is assumed to detect power withdrawal from the utility and
read the event of a spike in the power on the shared power bus. Strong secrecy can
be verified in Proverif using the noninterf keyword as shown in Figure 8.6. It can be
argued that strong secrecy is preserved in the FREEDM system since the migrations
currently take place in fixed quantum of power. This property is particularly useful
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to analyze the effect of partial information revealed to the attacker. For example,
in the case of a series of power migrations between a supply-demand pair involving
migratable quantum of non-uniform magnitude, the adversary can distinguish each
of the series indicating that he obtains partial information. However, in a FREEDM
system with 5 or more nodes, strong secrecy is always preserved unless there is a
unique pair of nodes in Supply and Demand states, respectively.
(* The main process defining the system *)
process
(!(DGI_Supply) | !(DGI_Demand) )
Figure 8.5. Proverif process defining FREEDM
8.2.3. Weak Secrecy. Weak secret refers to the information that the
attacker may guess through passive or active observation of the system. A common
example of weak secrets are human memorable passwords used in some protocols
which are often values with low information entropy. The attacker may enumerate
all the possible values and end up with the exact value though repeated trial. In
Proverif, any name can be verified to determine if it is a weak secret, using the





Figure 8.6. Using Proverif secrecy features on FREEDM
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The time taken for the verification of all the properties is about 1.14 seconds
and about 1.45 seconds for weak equivalence on a computer with Intel Core 2 Duo
processor having 2.4 GHz and 2GBmemory running Mac OS X 10.5. This proves that
Proverif is far efficient compared to MWB. The results with Proverif are summarized
in Table 8.2.
Table 8.2. Results of verification with Proverif
Property
Verified Process/Name 3-node system 5-node system




DGI_Demand x 1.28 secs X 1.45 secs
Strong
Secret g1, g2 X 1.14 secs X 1.14 secs
Weak
Secret delta1, delta2 X 1.14 secs X 1.14 secs
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9. CONCLUSIONS
This dissertation investigates the confidentiality properties in cyber-physical
systems using formal methods. Modeling and verification of information flow proper-
ties for CPSs was discussed. First, the need for information flow analysis in CPSs has
been established. Several information flow properties exist, of which non-inference
and non-deducibility are appealing to distributed CPSs. Intuitively, an observer
who is able to distinguish the states of the system before and after the execution
of a critical event has more information about the system. The notion of bisimu-
lation provides a way to check whether two processes are behaviorally equivalent.
This property is instrumental in defining non-deducibility based properties using
process algebras. However, specification of the system and its attributes precede the
verification process. Modeling requires representation of the CPS and its diverse
components to be represented under a uniform framework. The use of process al-
gebras was demonstrated as a way of unifying the continuous and discrete aspects
of CPS. Process algebras were applied to a test CPS, to illustrate the proposed
modeling approach through which the behavior of a CPS, including the discrete dis-
tributed communication involving computation and the continuous flow dynamics of
the underlying physical system can be represented in a unified semantic framework.
The uniform representation of the CPS was later verified for known information flow
properties. The analysis includes undesirable cases of information flow to an attacker
in different contexts of the system operation.
The approach presented to analyze information flow in CPSs has three key
steps outlined below.
1) Specification of the system with the cyber and physical components
developed as communicating processes : The CPS was first represented
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as a composition of Security Process Algebra processes. Aspects of process
behavior such as concurrency, non-determinism, event transitions and commu-
nication had to be taken into account. Additionally, the events comprising the
processes can be classified into H or L security domains using SPA. Due to
the modeling limitations of SPA, pi-calculus was later studied to specify the
behavior of CPSs that involve link mobility and advanced distributed features
such as sending messages over communication channels.
2) Develop the continuous aspect as an interactive process that abstracts
away the continuous nature through discretization of physical flow
guided by an invariant : In SPA as well as in the pi-calculus, the continuous
environment (power flow in the test CPS) was developed as a process composed
of discrete events of change in value of flow that follows a physical invariant
(Kirchoff’s law in the test CPS). Such a process can interact with the rest of the
processes that comprise the system, as a cyber process. This was sufficient in
order to verify security properties instead of a more rigorous partial differential
equation system since the events of change that cause an observable event are
of the main concern.
3) Represent the information flow model in terms of the equivalence ver-
ification capability offered by the chosen process algebra : Using
SPA, non-deducibility was verified on the test CPS by representing in terms of
weak bisimulation equivalence (BNDC). This analysis revealed the events that
caused non-deducibility to fail and the design was fixed by allowing this failure
event to occur only when a compensating event takes place, thereby making it
BNDC. Using pi-calculus, non-deducibility was realized as a reduction closed
barbed congruence relation, that was verified for the FREEDM system with
three nodes and five nodes. The observer was able to distinguish between the
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case of power migration between a pair of supply-demand nodes from the nor-
mal operation, causing basic pi-ND to fail. However, it was verified that for
the system with five nodes, basic pi-ND is preserved.
Manual proofs were presented for all the cases studied using SPA and pi-
calculus. Automated tools were employed to verify the theorems presented, wherever
applicable. The results obtained using the manual and automated approaches were
the same, thereby justifying the correctness of the approach. Different notions of ob-
servational equivalence in pi-calculus offer diverse variants of information flow models
like the pi-non-deducibility that are important to certain CPS infrastructures. The
proposed approach makes it feasible to analyze new adversarial models and attack
behaviors.
Using probabilistic and temporal reasoning, the attacker can deduce more in-
formation like the time of occurrence of the operation, duration of the operation [22],
the frequency of occurrence, etc. This thought can be extended to the case where
an attacker uses event history, or collaborates with other attackers to deduce critical
information pertaining to the system. New mechanisms could be developed to find
compensating events within the system, and schedule them, to nullify the effect of
observable physical system responses such that the system preserves non-deducibility.
More work is required to apply formal techniques to specify the behavior and ver-
ify information flow properties in CPSs. These aspects also present a challenge for
future work in applying distributed system concepts to real systems and for the




A. MWB Encoding for a 3-node FREEDM System
agent DGI1(s1, s1g, state1, supply, e1) = s1(s1).t.’state1<state1>.t.’e1<supply>.
DGI1(s1, s1g, state1, supply, e1)
2
agent DGI2(s2, s2g, state2, demand, e2) = s2(s2).t.’state2<state2>.t.’e2<demand>.
DGI2(s2, s2g, state2, demand, e2)
4
agent PM(s1, s1g, s2, s2g) = (^z)t.’s1<s1g>.’s2<s2g>.PM(s1, s1g, s2, s2g)
6
agent DGI3(s3, state3, e1, e2, supply, demand) = s3(s3).t.’state3<state3>.DGI3(s3
, state3, e1, e2, supply, demand) + e1(supply).e2(demand).DGI3(s3, state3, e1
, e2, supply, demand)
8
agent PHY1(s1,s1g,bus) = t.s1(s1).’bus<s1g>.PHY1(s1,s1g,bus) + ’s1<s1>.t.PHY1(s1,
s1g,bus)
10
agent PHY2(s2,s2g,bus) = t.s2(s2).’bus<s2g>.PHY2(s2,s2g,bus) + ’s2<s2>.t.PHY2(s2,
s2g,bus)
12
agent PHY3(s3,s3g,bus) = t.s3(s3).’bus<s3g>.PHY3(s3,s3g,bus) + ’s3<s3>.t.PHY3(s3,
s3g,bus)
14
agent INV(s1g,s2g,s3g,bus) = ’bus<s1g>.’bus<s2g>.’bus<s3g>.INV(s1g,s2g,s3g,bus)
16
agent Node1(s1, state1, s1g, bus, supply, e1) = DGI1(s1, s1g, state1, supply, e1)
| PHY1(s1,s1g,bus)
18




agent Node3(s3, state3, s3g, bus, e1, e2, supply, demand) = DGI3(s3, state3, e1,
e2, supply, demand) | PHY3(s3,s3g,bus)
22
agent System(s1, state1, s2, state2, s3, state3, s1g,s2g,s3g,bus, e1, supply, e2,
demand) = Node1(s1, state1, s1g, bus, supply, e1) | Node2(s2, state2, s2g,
bus, demand, e2) | Node3(s3, state3, s3g, bus, e1, e2, supply, demand)| INV (
s1g,s2g,s3g,bus)
24
agent System2(s1, state1, s2, state2, s3, state3, s1g,s2g,s3g,bus, e1, supply, e2
, demand) = Node1(s1, state1, s1g, bus, supply, e1) | Node2(s2, state2, s2g,
bus, demand, e2) | Node3(s3, state3, s3g, bus, e1, e2, supply, demand)| INV (
s1g,s2g,s3g,bus) | PM(s1, s1g, s2, s2g)
B. MWB Encoding for a 5-node FREEDM System
1 agent DGI1(s1, s1g, state1, supply, e1) = s1(s1).t.’state1<state1>.t.’e1<supply>.
DGI1(s1, s1g, state1, supply, e1)
3 agent DGI2(s2, s2g, state2, demand, e2) = s2(s2).t.’state2<state2>.t.’e2<demand>.
DGI2(s2, s2g, state2, demand, e2)
5 agent DGI4(s4, s4g, state4, demand, e4) = s4(s4).t.’state2<state2>.t.’e4<demand>.
DGI4(s4, s4g, state4, demand, e4)
7 agent PM(s1, s1g, s2, s2g) = (^z)t.’s1<s1g>.’s2<s2g>.PM(s1, s1g, s2, s2g)
9 agent PM(s4, s4g, s5, s5g) = (^z)t.’s4<s4g>.’s5<s5g>.PM(s4, s4g, s5, s5g)
11 agent DGI3(s3, state3, e1, e2, supply, demand) = s3(s3).t.’state3<state3>.DGI3(s3
, state3, e1, e2, supply, demand) + e1(supply).e2(demand).DGI3(s3, state3, e1
, e2, supply, demand)
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13 agent DGI5(s5, state5, e1, e2, supply, demand) = s5(s5).t.’state5<state5>.DGI5(s5
, state5, e1, e2, supply, demand) + e1(supply).e2(demand).DGI5(s5, state5, e1
, e2, supply, demand)
15 agent PHY1(s1,s1g,bus) = t.s1(s1).’bus<s1g>.PHY1(s1,s1g,bus) + ’s1<s1>.t.PHY1(s1,
s1g,bus)
17 agent PHY2(s2,s2g,bus) = t.s2(s2).’bus<s2g>.PHY2(s2,s2g,bus) + ’s2<s2>.t.PHY2(s2,
s2g,bus)
19 agent PHY3(s3,s3g,bus) = t.s3(s3).’bus<s3g>.PHY3(s3,s3g,bus) + ’s3<s3>.t.PHY3(s3,
s3g,bus)
21 agent PHY4(s4,s4g,bus) = t.s4(s4).’bus<s4g>.PHY4(s4,s4g,bus) + ’s4<s4>.t.PHY4(s4,
s4g,bus)
23 agent PHY5(s5,s5g,bus) = t.s5(s5).’bus<s5g>.PHY5(s5,s5g,bus) + ’s5<s5>.t.PHY5(s5,
s5g,bus)
25 agent INV(s1g,s2g,s3g,s4g, s5g, bus) = ’bus<s1g>.’bus<s2g>.’bus<s3g>.INV(s1g,s2g,
s3g,s4g, s5g, bus)
27 agent Node1(s1, state1, s1g, bus, supply, e1) = DGI1(s1, s1g, state1, supply, e1)
| PHY1(s1,s1g,bus)
29 agent Node2(s2, state2, s2g, bus, demand, e2) = DGI2(s2, s2g, state2, demand, e2)
| PHY2(s2,s2g,bus)
31 agent Node3(s3, state3, s3g, bus, e1, e2, supply, demand) = DGI3(s3, state3, e1,
e2, supply, demand) | PHY3(s3,s3g,bus)
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33 agent Node4(s4, state4, s4g, bus, e1, e2, supply, demand) = DGI4(s4, state4, e1,
e2, supply, demand) | PHY4(s4,s4g,bus)
35 agent Node5(s5, state5, s5g, bus, e1, e2, supply, demand) = DGI5(s5, state5, e1,
e2, supply, demand) | PHY5(s5,s5g,bus)
37 agent System(s1, state1, s2, state2, s3, state3, s1g,s2g,s3g,bus, e1, supply, e2,
demand) = Node1(s1, state1, s1g, bus, supply, e1) | Node2(s2, state2, s2g,
bus, demand, e2) | Node3(s3, state3, s3g, bus, e1, e2, supply, demand)|
Node4(s4, state4, s4g, bus, e1, e2, supply, demand) | Node5(s5, state5, s5g, bus,
e1, e2, supply, demand)|
39 INV (s1g,s2g,s3g,s4g, s5g, bus)
41 agent System2(s1, state1, s2, state2, s3, state3, s1g,s2g,s3g,bus, e1, supply, e2
, demand) = Node1(s1, state1, s1g, bus, supply, e1) | Node2(s2, state2, s2g,
bus, demand, e2) | Node3(s3, state3, s3g, bus, e1, e2, supply, demand)|
Node4(s4, state4, s4g, bus, e1, e2, supply, demand) | Node5(s5, state5, s5g, bus,
e1, e2, supply, demand)|
43 INV (s1g,s2g,s3g,s4g, s5g, bus) | PM(s1, s1g, s2, s2g) | PM(s4, s4g, s5, s5g)
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